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Abstract
∗∗∗∗
This paper provides evidence on what affects the marginal cost and availability of
bank credit for firms in Argentina. We study in particular how banks use different
pieces of private and public information to screen firms and overcome
informational asymmetries in the credit market. While some private information,
such as balance sheet data, is transferable, private information generated in
relationships is not. To capture the closeness of bank relationships, we resort to
the concentration of bank credit and the number of credit lines in a bank. We also
consider public information available in the Central de Deudores.
The cost of credit is measured using overdrafts, the most expensive line of
credit, at the bank that charges the highest rate for overdrafts. We find that the
cost of credit is smaller for a firm with a close relationship to the marginal bank.
Firms with large assets, a high sales/assets ratio, and a low debt/assets ratio pay a
lower interest rate at the margin. A good credit history (no debt arrears and no
bounced checks) and collateral also reduce the marginal interest rate.
The availability of credit is measured by unused credit lines as a
proportion of total liabilities with the main bank. The availability of credit
depends positively on a close relationship with the main bank. Large assets, a
high return on assets, a high sales/assets ratio, a low debt/assets ratio, a good
credit history, and collateral lead to higher credit availability. Our measure of
unused credit lines is less ambiguous than traditional measures such as leverage,
which may indicate financial distress rather than availability of credit.
JEL: D82, E44, G14, G20
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1. Introduction
This paper seeks to evaluate the determinants of the variation in the cost and availability of bank
credit across firms in Argentina. This is a high profile issue, as many Argentine firms loudly
protest the high cost of bank credit and the difficulty of obtaining it. While the same grievances
are voiced in many countries, but in Argentina these complaints arise against a backdrop of
financial markets that are particularly underdeveloped, not only in comparison to those of OECD
countries, but also to those of other emerging market countries such as Chile (Caballero, 2000).
Stock market capitalization is low, as is financial intermediation in terms of the ratio of M3 to
GDP, or of loans to the private sector to GDP. To complete this picture, high country risk and
crowding out by the public sector have made credit constraints particularly acute for firms in
Argentina during the last two years.
In light of the limited options presented by weak capital markets, bank
1 credit is
particularly critical for firms in Argentina. There are fewer than a hundred firms quoted in the
stock exchange, while the financial system grants credit to over one hundred thousand legally
incorporated firms. Thus, as defined by Mayer (1994), Argentina can clearly be classified as a
banking economy, with a small proportion of quoted firms, as opposed to a market economy,
which has a high percentage of quoted firms.
In Argentina, changes in the cost of and access to credit over the past decade or so have
been substantial. There was practically no credit market in 1990. Banks had imploded, and the
few assets they had were concentrated in government securities. After the Convertibility Plan
was launched in 1991 with the aim of achieving price stability, lending to firms had to start
almost from scratch. Since it takes time to generate a track record to evaluate to risk of lending to
firms, it is no surprise that firms should initially have been subject to large individual credit
constraints. Over the course of the 1990s, banks compiled internal information on their client
firms as their lending relationships developed, and private credit bureaus and public credit
registers developed to pool this kind of privileged information.
Our goal is to see how these different bits and pieces of information affect the credit
constraints faced by firms. In the empirical literature, however, there is no straightforward
procedure to detect the presence of credit constraints. Usually, the presence of credit constraints
is detected indirectly, e.g., by the excess sensitivity of investment to liquidity (Schiantarelli,8
1996). This paper proposes a different approach to analyzing credit constraints—one that is
closest in spirit to Petersen and Rajan (1994), who measure credit constraints by the degree to
which firms resort to trade credit to finance their operations.  Rather than using trade credit as a
yardstick, however, we look instead at the lack of unused credit lines as an indicator of credit
constrained firms, using a cross-section for October 2000 we built with data collected from
financial institutions by the Banco Central de la República Argentina (BCRA). In measuring the
marginal cost of bank credit faced by a firm, we utilize the highest observed interest rate paid on
the most expensive type of loan, overdrafts. This credit option should be the last resort of the
firm, which would rationally attempt to exhaust cheaper sources of credit first.  This study
therefore focuses on the intensive credit margin, which refers to how much credit is available to
a firm that already operates with the financial system. Since we do not have data on firms that
have not received any credit from the financial system, the paper cannot explain extensive credit
margins that determine whether a firm is cut off from bank loans.
Our main findings are as follows. The availability of credit depends positively on close
relationships with a bank. Favorable characteristics of a firm (large assets, a high return to assets,
a high sales/assets ratio, and a low debt/assets ratio), a good credit history (normal credit
situation and no bounced checks) and collateral also lead to higher credit availability.
Significantly, a good median credit situation in the public credit register leads to higher credit
availability, suggesting that the Central de Deudores eases credit constraints for healthy firms.
With regard to the cost of credit, the findings mostly parallel those of credit availability. The cost
is lower for a firm with a close relationship to a bank. Firms with large assets, a high sales/assets
ratio, and a low debt/assets ratio pay a lower interest rate (returns on assets, however, turn out
not to be significant). A good credit history and collateral also reduce the interest rate.
An important difference between the effects on the price and the quantity of credit is that
as the credit situation deteriorates, the interest rate does not increase monotonically, even though
credit availability does decrease monotonically. Similarly, the median credit situation in the
public credit register does not affect the cost. These findings are consistent with credit rationing,
which predicts that beyond a certain point it makes no sense for the lender to raise interest rates
because that only increases the probability of default. Rather, as risk rises, lenders will cut back
on the supply of credit.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
1 All financial institutions supervised by the central bank will hereafter be referred to as “banks” for short.9
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 places our approach to how public and private
information impacts the market for bank loans in the context of the existing literature on the
topic. Section 3 describes the dataset constructed to characterize the workings of the loan market
for firms in Argentina. Section 4 presents our regressions on the cost of credit and the access to
credit at the margin. Section 5 presents the conclusions, as well as suggestions for further work.
2. Conceptual Framework
2.1. Theoretical Literature
Informational asymmetries are a central issue in credit markets. Freixas and Rochet (1997)
distinguish between three sets of asymmetric information: ex-ante asymmetric information
(adverse selection), interim asymmetric information (moral hazard), and ex-post asymmetric
information (costly state verification model, which can be related to ex-post moral hazard).
In the theoretical literature, asymmetric information has been identified as the source of
equilibrium credit rationing, as asymmetric information pushes the market away from a perfectly
competitive equilibrium where the intersection of demand and supply clears the market. The
classic contribution by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) predicts that a lender’s expected return on a
risky loan is a non-monotonic function of the interest rate. This can be due either to adverse
selection, because as interest rates rise the best borrowers drop out, or to moral hazard, because
at higher interest rates borrowers adopt riskier strategies. Hence, lenders may not be willing to
supply more credit beyond a certain interest rate. This may lead to a credit rationing equilibrium,
where borrowers are willing to demand more than they are supplied at the equilibrium interest
rate. This type of credit rationing is an intensive limit, or type 1 credit rationing. If lenders refuse
outright to supply any loans at all to some of the prospective customers at the prevailing interest
rate, the borrower faces instead an extensive limit, or type 2 credit rationing. This is, for
example, the case in the costly state verification version of credit rationing in Williamson (1987).
Banks are precisely the organizations that specialize in collecting information on
potential borrowers to price credit risks appropriately.
2 To alleviate the degree of asymmetric
information, banks resort to different mechanisms. A common practice by banks is to implement
screening mechanisms (in which case good firms have an incentive to signal their type, in order
                                                          
2 Banks can also be important to monitor borrowers, solving corporate governance problems related to moral hazard
(Allen, 2001).10
to differentiate themselves from bad firms and get better terms on their loans). Another response
to the problem of asymmetric information is the development of private information through
banking relationships.
In this regard, Petersen and Rajan (1994) distinguish between public and private
information in lending activities. Private information is the information that lenders acquire in
the course of relationships with borrowers--information that is not easily transferable to others.
Along the same lines, Berger, Klapper and Udell (2000) contrast relationship lending to pure
transactions lending. Relationship lending is based on information gathered by the lender
through contact over time with the firm, its owner, and the local business community. Pure
transactions lending is based on information from financial statements, credit scoring and other
similar quantitative techniques. This information is relatively public and transparent, and only
requires the analysis of currently available data.
The idea of relationship lending is illustrated in Akerlof’s (1970) example of local
moneylenders in credit markets in India who can lend profitably because of their knowledge of
local borrowers’ creditworthiness. Outside middlemen trying to arbitrage in that market, lending
at the same high rates, would lose money due to the risk of attracting borrowers with poor
repayment prospects. The emergence of financial intermediaries such as banks can thus be
explained as a way to solve the problem of asymmetric information in financial markets.
Relationship information is especially important for small firms. Small firms produce less
public information than large firms, which can instead resort directly to capital markets to place
debt (Diamond, 1991). Relationships affect the bank-firm interaction in at least two dimensions.
Concerning the amount of credit, Diamond (1984) shows that relationships allow a firm to have
more access to credit. With respect to the cost of credit, there is no clear-cut association between
interest rates and relationships. On the one hand, Diamond (1984) shows that a relationship with
a single bank may reduce risk, leading to a lower interest rate charged. The reduction in interest
rates is due both to the monitoring role of the bank, which reduces the incidence of moral hazard,
and to an improved knowledge of the firm, which helps to overcome the problem of adverse
selection. On the other hand, relationships provide a bank with inside information about the
firm’s financial health and prospects. The bank that lends to a firm learns more about it than
other banks do. This informational advantage gives the bank market power over the firm,
allowing it to extract rents attributable to knowing that the borrower is less risky than average11
(Sharpe, 1990). In summary, there are theoretical justifications for both an increase and decrease
of a firm’s interest rate with closer relationships.
Whether other information is private or public depends on the regulations in place, such
as laws of habeas data that guarantee privacy. Public credit registers and private credit bureaus
that pool the information of lenders reduce the degree of asymmetric information. Since
information is costly to produce, if it becomes public other lenders might have an incentive to
free ride and lure away the banks’ best clients through competitive rates. This might reduce the
incentives of banks to invest in relationship lending in the first place. While this may be the case
for positive information on borrowers, negative information helps to discipline borrowers,
reducing problems of moral hazard.
Asymmetric information and agency problems are not the only source of credit market
distortions. For example, an inefficient legal system may diminish the value of collateral, leading
to a credit constrained equilibrium where firms cannot take advantage of all their worthwhile
investment opportunities, despite the guarantees they can provide. Even if there is no credit
rationing, firms suffer from credit constraints due to these inefficiencies because interest rates
rise to clear the market. These problems can contribute to weak international financial links and
an underdeveloped domestic financial market (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 1999).
2.2.  Empirical Literature
Much of the literature on credit constraints faced by firms focuses on its effects on investment,
which can be detected through the excess sensitivity of investment to liquidity (Schiantarelli,
1996, provides a survey of this literature). There is also a specialized literature that looks at how
bank relationships can help ease liquidity constraints faced by firms. Hoshi, Kashyap and
Scharfstein (1990), for instance, look at the associations of firms with banks in Japan, showing
that the benefit of bank association for Japanese firms is that it reduces the excess sensitivity of
investment to cash flow in times of financial distress.
We follow a different tack. Our approach resembles Petersen and Rajan (1994) in that we
try to look more closely at the issue of credit availability in itself. The key insight in Petersen and
Rajan is that the use of trade credit can be an indication of credit constraints. In their study of
small business firms in the U.S., the average rate on bank loans is 1 percent per month, or 12
percent per year. They calculate that firms that do not take discounts for early payment forsake a12
2 percent discount to stretch the payment period by 20 days, equivalent to a 3 percent monthly
interest rate, or a 44 percent annual interest rate. Accordingly, the authors use the percentage of
discounts taken for early payment as an indication of firms that do not face credit constraints,
because they have access to cheaper credit from the financial system. Conversely, the percentage
of trade credit paid late is an indication of credit-constrained firms.
If trade credit discounts taken is an indirect indicator of credit availability in banks, an
alternative is to try to assess directly the availability of credit in banks. This is meaningful if line
of credit contracts or loan commitment contracts are important sources of loans. Melnik and
Plaut (1986) state that loan commitment contracts are behind more than 70 percent of
commercial and industrial loans in the U.S. They study the ex-ante tradeoffs between the size of
loan commitments and other variables such as interest rate premium charged and collateral
offered. Since they concentrate on the ex-ante determinants of line of credit contracts, Melnik
and Plaut provide no evidence on credit constraints per se. They do mention that credit
constraints can be interpreted as the ex-post usage of credit beyond these loan commitment
contracts when firms have to turn to spot loans at higher rates.
Regarding the effect of banking relationships on access to credit, Petersen and Rajan
(1994) show how their measures of lending relationships are related to reduced reliance on trade
credit. They interpret this in the sense that firms with closer relationships face fewer credit
constraints, having more access to cheaper bank credit. Later studies, using different measures of
credit availability, also find that relationships lead to more access to credit. Cole (1998) finds
that a potential lender is more likely to extend credit to a firm with which it has a pre-existing
relationship. Machauer and Weber (2000) find that a firm obtains a higher proportion of
financing from a bank with which it has a closer relationship, using as dependent variable the
ratio of the total credit line at each bank relative to the total assets of the firm.
In relation to the effects of relationships on the cost of credit, using the interest rate paid
on the last loan of each firm, Petersen and Rajan find that lending relationships affect the
quantity of credit more than they affect the cost of credit. A high number of banks, which signals
weaker relationships, is related to a higher cost of credit, but the length of the relationship does
not affect interest rates at all. Berger and Udell (1995), however, also using the interest rate paid
on the last loan, find that borrowers with longer-term banking relationships pay lower interest
rates. They restrict their analysis, though, to lending under lines of credit.13
A recent study by D’Auria, Foglia and Marullo-Reedtz (1999) establishes that close
relationships reduce the interest rate a firm is charged on uncollateralized overdraft facilities,
using as a proxy of close relationships the share of each bank over the total credit lines granted
by the banking system to individual borrowers. They also control for the number of banks as a
measure of competition, which of course interacts with the concentration of credit in a bank.
Their interpretation of the results implies that having closer relationships leads to lower rates, but
that there is a holdup problem if a firm operates exclusively with one bank. A small degree of
competition among banks reinforces the reduction in the firm’s interest rate, while further
increasing the number of banks leads to higher interest rates.
Combining the approaches in Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Melnik and Plaut (1986), we
utilize the unused portion of pre-committed credit lines as a measure of firms that are not credit
constrained. As previously mentioned, unused credit lines can be interpreted as an intensive, not
an extensive, measure of credit constraints. An extensive credit constraint is the case when no
bank is willing ex-ante to sign a line of credit contract with a firm. All the firms in our sample
have bank credit, so they do not face this type of constraint (except a few firms in our sample
that only have write-offs). However, even those firms that are given a credit line face a
maximum credit limit or commitment. This limit is potentially an intensive credit constraint.
Firms that ex-post have unused credit lines are not credit constrained, but the lack of unused
credit lines may provide direct evidence on firms that face intensive credit constraints. We also
believe that unused credit lines may be a less ambiguous measure of credit availability than total
debt figures that are often used in the literature.
3. Dataset
A database was assembled, drawing information mainly from the Central de Deudores del
Sistema Financiero (Center of Debtors of the Financial System) of the Banco Central de la
República Argentina (BCRA). The information on firms comprises incorporated firms that are
“large debtors” or “principal debtors” of the financial system, which does not necessarily mean
that they are large firms.
We put together a cross-section of interest rates and debt of firms with each individual
bank for October 2000. This section describes the main characteristics of this dataset. Previous
researchers working with Central de Deudores, such as Berger, Klapper and Udell (2000), did14
not use the information on interest rates and on the balance sheets of firms because they
considered the information to be too unreliable, if not altogether useless. To overcome the
drawbacks in the underlying information, extensive preparatory groundwork was done before
running the econometric estimates.
3.1. Assets of Firms
We were able to collect balance sheet information on 17,809 firms, of which 17,394 firms
reported positive assets. However, not all the information was equally reliable. We followed two
alternative approaches to screen out the noise in the information. We first used filters to try to
eliminate problematic observations. We then came up with an alternative validation process that
distinguished different degrees of reliability of the information (see Appendix A).
In our figures on the domestic financial system in October 2000, only 16,095 of the
17,394 firms with positive assets show up, in part because the balance sheet information is
mostly from 1997, 1998 and 1999. Of these 16,095 firms, 15,796 were active clients in October
2000, while the remaining firms only had write-offs. These 15,796 firms form what we call the
complete sample. We also work with three different sub-samples of information that we regard
as more reliable. Table 1 shows the assets of the firms in the complete sample, classified
according to economic sector (note that 1 peso = 1 dollar).
Table 1.
Sector Cases Minimum Mean Median Maximum
Unclassified 1,776 0.1 6,108 1,574 780,710
Agriculture, fishing or livestock 3,076 0.1 15,106 2,130 24,400,000
Mining 111 0.1 96,351 4,411 4,363,000
Industry 3,548 0.1 68,018 3,409 126,000,000
Electricity, water or gas 125 11.9 369,145 63,253 9,719,920
Construction 1,052 0.1 23,406 2,519 5,915,785
Wholesale or retail distribution 2,947 0.1 19,400,000 2,039 57,000,000,000
Services 3,161 0.1 207,216 2,820 426,000,000
* 15,796 firms.
Source: BCRA
Assets of Firms in Complete Sample*
 - in thousands of pesos -15
Table 2 shows the assets of firms in the most reduced sample. This sub-sample satisfies a
journalistic requirement, i.e., that two or more different sources agree on the original information
(validation criteria 1/2/3/5/7).
Table 2.
Sector Cases Minimum Mean Median Maximum
Unclassified 210 12 10,242 4,201 332,296
Agriculture, fishing or livestock 528 1 11,209 4,333 482,676
Mining 37 226.6 84,632 6,282 1,371,330
Industry 1,352 0.1 145,819 8,271 126,000,000
Electricity, water or gas 66 12 280,561 132,417 1,993,481
Construction 369 58.4 24,532 5,325 773,847
Wholesale or retail distribution 947 0.1 16,978 4,314 1,720,693
Services 908 0.1 44,842 5,696 6,281,000
**4 ,417 firms that satisfy validation criteria 1/2/3/5/7 in Appendix A.
Source: BCRA
Assets of Firms in Reduced Sample**
- in thousands of pesos -
In the most restrictive sub-sample most of the outliers of the complete sample are
eliminated (one of which exceeded the size of Argentina’s GDP by 200 times). However, this
reduced sample is made up by only a little more than a quarter of the firms, and the median size
of assets is around twice as large as in the complete sample.
An intermediate sub-sample adds to this reduced group the firms whose information has
been reported on at least two different dates to the BCRA, in which case we picked the most
recent date. For this intermediate sample of 5,849 firms, the relation between their liabilities in
the financial system in October 2000 and the book value of their assets is shown in Table 3.
Though there are still outliers, the information on assets is better than in the complete sample
(not shown). This sub-sample of firms will be our preferred information set for the econometric
estimations.16
Table 3.
Min Max Mean Median Mean Median Min Max
Decile ($1000) ($1000) ($1000) ($1000) ($1000) ($1000) ($1000) ($1000) Cases
1 0.1 104.9 42 38 13,653 2,299 1 662,844 585
2 104.9 214.9 166 170 3,184 1,617 1 102,235 586
3 214.9 314.9 264 263 4,235 1,573 3 664,844 585
4 314.9 455.7 382 379 3,781 2,079 1 164,811 586
5 455.7 659.0 550 542 23,326 2,591 1 5,915,785 583
6 659.0 987.5 813 807 6,557 3,421 14 206,641 586
7 987.5 1,587.1 1,264 1,249 9,456 4,914 201 656,147 584
8 1,587.1 2,854.1 2,124 2,062 12,757 7,199 0.1 254,887 585
9 2,854.1 6,422.0 4,304 4,160 32,244 13,907 1 1,259,205 585
10 6,422.0 294,433.2 30,537 14,097 414,761 65,177 0.1 126,000,000 584
*Firms that satisfy validation criteria 1/2/3/5/7/13  in Appendix A.
Source: BCRA.
Bank liabilities Assets of firms in that range
Relation between Assets and Bank Liabilities*
3.2 Bank Liabilities
The information on the liabilities of each firm with the financial system covers four items: loans,
unused credit lines, shares not quoted on the stock exchange, and write-offs. Though unused
credit lines are a potential liability, we will simply call the aggregate figure “bank liabilities.”
This information on quantities is validated by the BCRA: the total for each item, added up over
all the clients of each bank, has to agree with the amount reported by the bank to the BCRA on
its balance sheet. If these totals do not coincide, the information is rejected.
Table 4 shows the liabilities for our complete sample of firms (including those that only
have write-offs) for October 2000. The average number of operations refers to the average
number of banks with which firms have accounts for each line.
Table 4.
Item Total ($1,000)  
Total/no. of 
firms*         








Loans 41,460,414 2,576 96.2 2,677 3.1 850
Unused credit lines  4,892,558 304 41.9 726 1.6 454
Unquoted shares 1,209,843 75 1.1 7,117 2.1 3,467
Write-offs 720,395 45 9.3 483 1.9 251
Total 48,283,210 3,000 100.0 3,000 3.3 905
*16,095 firms with bank liabilities reported in October 2000.
Source: Central de Deudores, BCRA.
Breakdown of Bank Liabilities17
According to Información de Entidades Financieras published by the BCRA, liabilities
in the whole financial system in September 2000 totaled 102 billion pesos, of which 36 billion
corresponded to partnerships and sole proprietorships (5,162,305 cases) and 66 billion to
corporations (116,960 cases). Our complete database of 16,095 firms adds up to 48 billion pesos
in October 2000. These firms represent a little under 15 percent of the corporations, but over 75
percent of the debt of incorporated firms.
Starting in October 2000, a detailed breakdown of loans is available. The loans are
classified into 17 different types, as presented in Table 5.
Table 5.
Type of loan Total  ($1000)
Total/no. of 
firms 




Average no.  
operations
Total /no.  
operations
Overdrafts 6,138,594 381 65.3 584 2.3 259
Discounted bills - guarantee A1 1,310 0 0.1 62 1.0 62
Discounted bills - guarantee A2 000000
Bills and promissory notes 13,990,700 869 58.2 1,494 2.1 717
House mortgages 19,663 1 0.6 195 1.0 191
Other mortgages 2,380,451 148 25.1 590 1.1 519
Car loans 32,772 2 4.0 51 1.0 50
Other pledges 1,072,312 67 24.9 267 1.3 203
Personal 44,741 3 6.8 41 1.1 37
Credit card 195,885 12 16.8 73 1.2 60
Interfinancial 1,866,267 116 0.3 33,326 3.9 8640
To guaranteed public bank 355,638 22 0.0 59,273 1.2 50805
Other loans 13,364,295 830 42.7 1,946 1.4 1376
Other financial 1,228,170 76 35.7 214 1.3 168
Leases 702,075 44 7.2 610 1.1 531
Miscellaneous 43,224 3 0.4 745 1.0 733
Small personal 746 0 0.0 149 1.0 149
Source: Central de Deudores, BCRA.
Breakdown of Loans
There is also a breakdown of unused credit lines into four categories. Banks have to
provision unused credit lines for losses in the same manner as with actual loans. If banks include
a clause that allows them to revoke the credit line at any moment, they are not obliged to inform
the BCRA of the unused portion. Hence, the unused credit lines that are reported represent
unused portions of loan commitment contracts.18
Table 6.
Type of credit line
Total         
($1000) Total/no.  firms








Overdraft facilities 381,926 24 29.0 82 1.3 64
Eventual liabilities 1,155,193 72 9.9 726 1.6 462
Guarantees granted 2,790,482 173 15.8 1,094 1.3 838
Endorsements and external credit lines 564,957 35 0.5 6,494 1.0 6,348
Source: Central de Deudores, BCRA.
Breakdown of Unused Credit Lines
Information on collateral for each type of loan and unused line of credit line is available.
Collateral is divided into guarantees of type A (the best), type B, or type C (no collateral at all).
3.3. Interest Rates on Loans
Interest rates on each type of loan, as well as the average duration of these loans, is available for
October 2000. The BCRA has not yet implemented a validation procedure similar to that applied
to quantities, so interest rate figures are not very reliable. Appendix B describes how this
information was processed. The validated interest rate information is presented in Table 7 (the
total cases in the original database are listed in the last column).
Table 7.
Total
Type of Loan Mean  (%) Median  (%) Std deviation Cases* cases**
Overdrafts 2.54 2.04 1.6 15,529 23,720
Discounted bills - guarantee A 2.22 2.17 0.4 20 21
Bills and promissory notes 1.28 1.19 0.5 13,465 19,517
House mortgages 1.04 1.02 0.2 77 103
Other mortgages 1.14 1.08 0.6 2,724 4,589
Car loans 1.41 1.46 0.3 509 660
Other pledges 1.27 1.20 0.9 2,530 5,279
Personal 1.82 1.75 0.7 530 1,198
Credit card 2.43 2.59 0.9 1,727 3,283
Interfinancial 4.97 0.75 19.9 132 216
To guaranteed public 0.91 0.90 0.1 7 7
Other loans 1.39 1.28 0.8 5,488 9,712
Other financial 1.07 1.00 0.5 1,282 7,327
Leases 1.25 1.28 0.3 481 1,323
Miscellaneous 1.09 0.99 0.8 47 59
Small personal 1.12 0.99 0.2 5 5
*Restricted to rates with monthly values over 0.1.
**All observations, including  rates <=0.1, as well as rates reported by banks that were excluded for misreporting figures.
Source: Central de Deudores, BCRA.
Interest Rates in Validated Sample
Validated sample19
Bank overdrafts are, on average, the most expensive type of loans. We disregard
information on inter-financial loans, because these rates appear to be greatly under-reported in
the transformed sample, accounting for less than 2 percent per month in the year 2000.
Furthermore, this type of debt does not qualify for our sample that targets non-financial firms.
The only other rate that is close to overdrafts is the rate charged on credit cards.
3.4. Marginal Cost of Credit
As mentioned, our measure of the marginal cost of credit is the highest observed interest rate on
overdrafts paid by a firm in the financial system. Applying this definition, the marginal rate
turned out to be slightly above 3 percent per month (with small fluctuations according to the
specific sub-sample of firms used). We could have used instead the highest observed interest rate
charged on any type of loan. However, in 85 percent of the cases of firms that use overdrafts, the
highest rate is indeed the rate charged on overdrafts. As to the relevance of the interest rate on
overdrafts, Table 5 shows that 65 percent of the firms in our dataset used overdrafts in October
2000.
An advantage of only using overdrafts is that we have a homogeneous type of loan that
reduces the influence of unobserved loan characteristics on the cost of credit. The rate charged
on overdrafts can be reviewed monthly. Though overdrafts can be rolled over and do not have a
specified termination date, one would expect their duration to be quite short. Table 8 presents the
data on maturity. The data has never been validated, so medians seem more reliable than
averages. The median of one month for overdrafts confirms that the duration of overdrafts is
short.20
Table 8.
Type of loan Average months Median months Min Max Cases
Overdrafts 4 1 0 590 23,720
Discounted bills - guarantee A 11 1 0 119 21
Bills and promissory notes 7 1 0 770 19,517
House mortgages 131 93 0 833 103
Other mortgages 42 10 0 963 4,589
Car loans 20 16 0 237 660
Other pledges 12 1 0 450 5,279
Personal 5 0 0 200 1,198
Credit card 1 1 0 590 3,283
Interfinancial 2 1 0 64 216
To guaranteed public bank 31 28 9 82 7
Other loans 7 1 0 925 9,712
Other financial 9 1 0 999 7,327
Leases 12 1 0 139 1,323
Miscellaneous 72 21 0 455 59
Small personal 7 6 2 15 5
*Complete database
Source: Central de Deudores, BCRA.
Maturity by Loan Type*
Since overdrafts are very short-term liabilities, they are overwhelmingly denominated in
pesos. As the maturity lengthens, debt tends to be denominated in dollars. This is most clearly so
for the debts with longest maturity, house mortgages.
As credit card lines are similar to overdrafts in several aspects, we could have considered
both types of debt together. In particular, credit cards are subject both to pre-established rates
and to credit limits characteristic of loan commitment contracts. However, we decided against
this approach because they are not completely homogeneous lines. According to Table 5, the
average size of operations with credit cards is substantially smaller than that of overdrafts, and
their use by firms is much less widespread.
3.5. Access to Additional Credit
Two possible alternatives as measures of credit constraints are the percentage of overdrafts over
total bank credit, and the percentage of authorized overdrafts effectively drawn on.
With respect to the first alternative, our conjecture was that overdrafts, being the most
expensive, would be the last type of loan a firm would resort to in the financial system.
Moreover, their cost at the margin resembles the trade credit paid late variable in Petersen and
Rajan (1994), whicht amounted to a rate of 3 percent per month. If trade credit paid late could21
indicate that the firm faced credit constraints, we initially thought that a high percentage of
overdrafts in relation to total bank loans could indicate the same problem. However, we ran into
a snag, as Table 9 shows. The first column presents the median of a firm’s credit situation in all
banks. The credit situation for firms goes from 1 (the best credit standing) to 5 (the worst credit










bank loans**  
(%)
1 11,788 71.5 31.7
1.5 306 67.6 21.5
2 581 51.6 28.1
2.5 214 58.9 24.8
3 497 46.3 29.5
3.5 149 57.0 25.3
4 909 63.5 33.0
4.5 220 48.6 37.0
5 1,352 31.4 33.0
5.5 32 28.1 23.5
6 4 72 9 . 83 5 . 3
*This refers to complete database of 16,095 firms.
**This refers only to firms actually using overdrafts.
Source: Central de Deudores, BCRA.
Overdrafts Drawn by Credit Situation*
Though the percentage of credit drawn through overdrafts is roughly constant across
categories, the percentage of firms that actually use overdrafts tends to fall as the credit situation
deteriorates. This seems to indicate that firms are cut off from overdrafts when they run into
financial trouble. Unlike trade credit, the supply of which might be thought of as fairly elastic,
overdrafts are part of loan commitment contracts that are subject to a prior approval process.
This illustrates why the use of overdrafts is an ambiguous indicator of credit rationing. Even if it
is the most expensive source of credit in the financial system, the firms in the worst shape have
less access to it. In this sense, using overdrafts poses problems similar to using leverage
indicators, as discussed in Section 4.
The second alternative measure of credit constraints, the percentage of authorized
overdrafts effectively drawn on, takes into account that overdrafts are a line of credit contract22
subject to pre-defined quotas. Our conjecture was that the amount of unused overdrafts could
provide valuable information to identify firms that were not credit constrained. Firms in good
condition would tend to use overdrafts infrequently, while troubled firms would tend to exhaust
their available credit. Since overdrafts are limited, and could be expected to be the credit source
of last resort, once that limit is reached one would expect the firm to be credit constrained in the
financial system.
 Both of these measurements, however, depend on information for which records may not
be readily available. In contrast to these limited sources of information, banks provide detailed
information to the central bank on all unused credit lines that are part of loan commitment
contracts. Consequently, bearing in mind Petersen and Rajan’s (1994) use of trade credit
discounts as a shadow indicator of credit availability across banks, developed a similar measure
based on unused credit lines.  This perspective also relates to the view in Melnik and Plaut
(1986) that credit constraints are related withex-post use of credit in excess of the amounts
agreed upon in loan commitment contracts.
As mentioned above, the BCRA requires banks to provision unused credit lines for credit
risk unless the credit line is revocable at any time, so the figures of unused credit lines basically
reflect loans backed by loan commitment contracts that have been granted but not drawn. The
following table shows the behavior of unused overdrafts in columns three and four, while
columns five and six refer to total unused credit lines, which includes unused overdrafts.23
Table 10.
Median of Total cases
credit 
situation % firms
as % of  
liabilities* % firms
as % of 
liabilities**
1 1 1 , 7 8 83 7 . 21 0 . 85 2 . 62 1 . 3
1.5 306 23.5 6.2 33.0 11.2
2 581 15.8 7.1 22.2 9.8
2.5 214 9.3 11.8 16.4 13.1
3 497 9.7 8.2 18.1 15.3
3.5 149 6.7 14.7 10.7 10.3
4 909 2.9 13.2 10.1 8.3
4.5 220 1.8 17.3 7.3 11.4
5 1,352 0.7 10.9 4.0 9.3
5.5 32 0.0 0.2 6.3 0.2
6 47 4.3 24.4 6.4 25.3
*This refers only to firms that actually have unused overdrafts.
**This refers only to firms that actually have unused credit lines.
Source: Central de Deudores, BCRA.
Unused Credit Lines by Credit Situation
Unused overdrafts Unused credit lines
For example, column five shows that 53 percent of firms with a median credit standing of
1 have unused credit lines, while the last column shows that this represents 21 percent of their
bank liabilities. Only a large number of firms with the best credit record have unused credit lines
on hand, and these represent a larger share of their bank liabilities. Unused overdrafts follow
approximately the same pattern, but they are less representative of available sources of funds in
banks. For that reason, our final measure of credit availability was unused credit lines as a
percentage of liabilities within the financial system.
3.6 Bank Relationships
Argentina has anunderdeveloped capital market. Few firms are quoted on the stock exchange,
there is a negligible domestic corporate bond market, and most firms basically have to rely on
bank debt. As mentioned before, Argentina resembles what Mayer (1994) calls a banking
economy, with a small proportion of quoted companies, a high concentration of ownership, and
long-term relations between banks and industry, as opposed to market economies where the
opposite holds. This fact makes the impact of banking relationships particularly relevant.
More generally, banking relationships are important for small and medium enterprises
(SMEs), because SMEs are typically the firms that are most likely to resort to bank credit. As24
discussed in more detail below, most of the Argentine firms in our dataset are SMEs.  Despite
this high lending activity, SMEs have aptly been described as informationally opaque firms
because of the limited public information that they provide (Berger, Klapper, and Udell, 2000).
Though we do not have access to the private information generated in relationships, there are
several variables that have been taken in the literature as signals of close or weak relationships.
We use proxies to represent bank relationships. Table 11 shows the behavior of three
measures of relationships as the size of financial liabilities increases. These measures of
relationships refer to the number of banks with which a firm has accounts, the extent of the
business it conducts with each bank, and the importance that the main bank has in covering its
financial needs.
Table 11.
Min Max Mean Median Average Median Average Median Average Median
Deciles Cases ($1000) ($1000) ($1000) ($1000) (%) (%)
1 1,610 0.1 41 13 9 1.5 1 1.2 1 92 100
2 1,611 41 127 84 83 2.1 2 1.5 1 83 94
3 1,610 127 205 168 168 2.3 2 1.6 2 81 89
4 1,609 205 272 237 235 2.4 2 1.6 2 81 90
5 1,609 272 363 314 312 2.7 2 1.6 2 78 81
6 1,608 363 502 427 425 3.0 3 1.7 2 74 74
7 1,610 502 757 613 606 3.3 3 1.7 2 71 71
8 1,609 757 1,342 1,007 982 4.0 4 1.8 2 67 64
9 1,610 1,342 3,413 2,127 2,001 4.8 4 1.8 1.8 64 61
10 1,609 3,413 1,702,432 25,017 7,856 7.0 6 1.7 1.7 56 51
*Write-offs are excluded, so firms that only register write-offs in the financial system are not counted.
Source: Central de Deudores, BCRA.
Bank Relationships by Size of Liabilities
no. banks no. credit lines* liabilities bank/system* Liabilities
The average number of financial institutions (no. banks) is inversely related to the
strength of bank relationships. The number of banks rises with the size of liabilities, so larger
firms rely less on any given financial institution (as a rule they also rely less on bank credit to
finance their needs).
The average number of types of loans, unused credit lines and unquoted shares (no. credit
lines) is directly related to the strength of relationships. The number of operations with each
financial institution shows no marked upward trend with size. Note that there are up to 17 types
of loans, 4 types of unused credit lines, and unquoted shares count as 1, so this variable can reach
a maximum value of 22.25
The concentration of operations with the largest creditor institution (liabilities
bank/system), measured by the ratio of the liabilities in the main bank to liabilities in the
financial system, exclusive of write-offs, is directly related to the strength of the relationship
with the main bank. The concentration decreases with the size of liabilities. However, even in the
largest decile the median firm conducts 50 percent of its business with a single institution.
Note that only in the last three deciles of Table 11 are there firms with liabilities in the
domestic financial system above a million pesos. If one takes as a working definition of SMEs
those firms that receive less than 2.5 million in loans from the financial system (Burdisso,
D’Amato, Escudé and McCandless, 2001), over 85 percent of the firms in our complete sample
are SMEs. On the other hand, in the more restrictive set of firms that satisfies the validation
criteria described in Appendix A, Table 3 shows that, applying this same criterion of bank debt,
over 75 percent are SMEs.
4. Econometric Evidence
Our goal here is to see what can be learned about the high cost and the limited access of firms to
credit in Argentina from the cross-sectional variation among firms. We try to measure the cost
and the availability of bank credit at the margin. Although our methodology is inspired by
Petersen and Rajan (1994), we use some different right-hand variables that extend the study to
see the impact of credit history. We also use different left-hand variables, which can be related to
the ideas of loan commitment contracts in Melnik and Plaut (1986).
The cost of credit is captured by the marginal interest rate that a firm has to pay on
overdrafts. With respect to the access to credit, we start by running some regressions based on
leverage similar to those commonly used in the literature. However, high leverage is inherently
ambiguous because it may indicate either that a firm enjoys high credit availability or that it is in
financial distress. We then propose an alternative approach to detect credit-constrained firms
based on the proportion of outstanding credit lines.
In each case, we first run regressions for different subsets of information to see if more
restrictive validation criteria lead to more precise estimates. Naturally, a more restrictive
validation criterion leaves fewer observations, hopefully of better quality for the problem
analyzed. So there is an implicit trade-off when restricting the sample in which degrees of
freedom are sacrificed to obtain more relevant observations.26
We are interested in evaluating how information affects credit conditions. If banks can
screen between good and bad credit risks more easily, this should reduce the problem of
“lemons,” improving good firms’ access to credit. Do close relationships matter? It seems they
do, reducing the cost of credit and increasing the access to credit. It appears that firms with
closer ties to financial institutions not only share a considerable amount of information with
banks, but also show they are good credit risks. Otherwise, if the firm were bad, the bank would
lose interest indeveloping or maintaining the relationship once it got to know the firm better.
Does credit history matter? It seems to matter, but whereas the negative effect on the
access to credit seems to increase monotonically as the credit history deteriorates, the effect on
interest rates is more of a step function. This makes sense from the perspective of credit
rationing, since raising interest rates to firms in very bad shape only increases the probability of
default.
Public information also seems to matter, since the credit history in other financial
institutions impacts the access to credit of a bank’s client. We also control for characteristics of a
firm from financial statements, as well as for characteristics of banks and loans, and, when
possible, for the industrial sector to which the firm belongs.
4.1 Overdraft Rate at Marginal Bank
In the interest rate regression, our dependent variable is the interest rate paid by firms on their
overdraft account, which we consider informative. In case a firm uses more than one overdraft
account, the paper uses the overdraft account that pays the highest interest rate. Using this
definition, the marginal overdraft interest rate is on average slightly above 3 percent per month.
Because a firm can switch overnight from one account to another, or from one bank to
another, thereby canceling its outstanding overdrafts, it seems rational to use the most expensive
overdraft account used as the marginal account. As discussed in Section 3, the interest rate on
overdrafts is a relevant interest rate for most of the firms with relationships with the financial
sector, and it is used more often than any other single credit line. In those firms actually using
overdrafts, it is almost always the highest recorded rate.
From an econometric perspective, the advantage of concentrating the analysis on the rate
of a specific credit line is that we do not have to model the influence of line-specific factors that
affect the underlying rate. Those controls would be necessary if the analysis were to be made on27
the highest rate charged on any line. In addition, the characteristic that this account is priced
monthly facilitates the estimation procedure, because there is no need to introduce extra variables
to measure the underlying cost. The constant of the regression should capture it. The paper
estimates the following regression function:
Highest overdraft interest rate =  β 0 + β 1 Firm specific information + β 2 Industry dummies
 + β 3  Loan and lender characteristics +  β 4 Credit history + β 5  Measures of Relationships  + ε
The equation introduces controls for firm specific information, industry dummies, and
loan and lender characteristics. We follow Petersen and Rajan (1994) in using relationship
characteristics to capture the influence of private information. Variables on credit history, not
used by Petersen and Rajan (1994), are also introduced in the regressions. As emphasized by
Greene (1992), credit history plays an important role in interest rate formation and access to
credit. Parameters are estimated by ordinary least squares using the Eicker-White
heteroskedasticity consistent estimator for standard errors.
The columns in Table 12 display four different sets of firms. Regression 1 corresponds to
the complete sample, while regression 2 applies a filter to eliminate problematic observations
(roa=0, and cases where either assets or liabilities or net worth are between 0 and 1 thousand
pesos). Regression 3 corresponds to registers where at least two sources agree on the information
(validation criteria 1/2/3/5/7). Regression 4 also includes firms whose balance sheet information
has been regularly updated by a bank (validation criterion 13). This information, though it cannot
be cross-checked with other reports, seems to behave much like the information that can be
checked. Given the large heterogeneity of the sample considered, the possible presence of
outliers that can seriously affect least squares estimates cannot be dismissed in advance. We also
estimated all models using robust methods. We used Huber’s biweight function based on Cook’s
distance (see Wilcox, 1997, for details). The robust estimates (not shown) are fairly similar to














roa 0.000 0.000 0.076 0.075
(-1.12) (-1.12) (1.06) (1.07)
lnassets -0.100 -0.125 -0.150 -0.129
(-9.18)*** (-8.72)*** (-6.85)*** (-6.98)***
lnsales/assets -0.246 -0.245 -0.189 -0.180
(-6.39)*** (-5.32)*** (-2.36)** (-2.68)***
lndebt/assets 0.011 0.154 0.624 0.452
(0.12) (1.41) (2.83)*** (2.45)**
sector 0 0.215 0.110 -0.160 0.020
(3.25)*** (1.40) (-1.15) (0.19)
sector 1 0.129 0.130 -0.004 0.110
(2.24)** (2.03)** (-0.04) (1.22)
sector 3 -0.033 -0.075 -0.434 -0.237
(-0.16) (-0.35) (-1.31) (-0.87)
sector 5 -0.059 0.010 -0.306 -0.244
(-0.29) (0.05) (-1.12) (-0.96)
sector 6 0.272 0.223 0.163 0.220
(3.78)*** (2.84)*** (1.38) (2.09)**
sector 7 0.110 0.066 -0.086 -0.003
(2.16)** (1.19) (-1.05) (-0.04)
sector 8 0.302 0.266 0.158 0.198
(5.65)*** (4.55)*** (1.76)* (2.54)**
situation 2 0.652 0.539 0.511 0.577
(6.32)*** (4.71)*** (2.98)*** (3.72)***
situation 3 0.252 0.258 0.002 0.084
(2.62)*** (2.44)** (0.01) (0.56)
situation 4 0.422 0.501 0.538 0.475
(5.87)*** (6.23)*** (4.66)*** (4.45)***
situation 5 0.228 0.121 0.170 0.205
(2.22)** (0.97) (0.95) (1.23)
situation 6 0.811 0.994 0.698 0.767
(2.55)** (2.41)** (1.69)* (1.90)*
lnbounced/liabilities 0.048 0.049 0.072 0.066
(5.42)*** (4.88)*** (4.62)*** (4.67)***
unwarranted/overdrafts  0.896 0.903 0.893 0.963
(10.19)*** (9.09)*** (5.49)*** (6.90)***
foreign bank=1 0.198 0.153 0.165 0.146
(5.09)*** (3.54)*** (2.51)** (2.55)**
public bank=1 0.110 0.213 0.295 0.261
(1.27) (1.99)* (1.70)* (1.63)
wholesale bank=1 -1.000 -1.005 -0.989 -1.011
(-11.33)*** (-10.62)*** (-7.99)*** (-8.90)***
bank's market share -8.779 -9.118 -9.484 -8.724
(-15.54)*** (-14.56)*** (-9.84)*** (-10.36)***
liabilities bank/system -0.690 -0.647 -0.653 -0.646
(-11.21)*** (-9.27)*** (-5.39)*** (-6.45)***
no. banks 0.069 0.084 0.092 0.090
(9.06)*** (10.11)*** (8.45)*** (8.89)***
no. credit lines -0.129 -0.136 -0.133 -0.142
(-7.23)*** (-6.84)*** (-4.38)*** (-5.37)***
_cons 3.525 3.646 3.617 3.396
(24.65)*** (20.68)*** (12.73)*** (14.33)***
Number of observations 8548 7010 3112 3963
F 63.44 55.34 25.91 33.52
P r o b  >  F 0000
R-squared 0.1569 0.1653 0.1735 0.1755
Adj R-squared 0.1544 0.1623 0.1668 0.1703
Root MSE 1.58 1.5859 1.6279 1.5897
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS
 +
Excludes roa=0 and balance sheets with problems.
 
++
 Validation criteria 1/2/3/5/7 in Appendix A.
 
+++
 Validation criteria 1/2/3/5/7/13 in Appendix A.
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. 1, 2 and 3 asterisks indicate significance at 10%, 5% or 1%.
Interest Rate Regressions: Different Sub-samples29
Though we are more confident in the samples of regressions 3 and 4, the estimates in
Table 12 are not very sensitive to the specific sample used. In the initial estimates, many
coefficients in the first two regressions had signs significantly different from the last two
regressions. Once more controls were put in place, the most noteworthy differences are that in
the first two regressions lndebt/assets is not statistically significant, and that roa has a negative
sign (though it is never statistically significant).
3 The main results on the cost of credit (skipping
the controls for industry dummies sector*) are as follows. Looking at a firm’s characteristics, the
cost of credit is negatively and significantly associated with the amount of assets (lnassets) and
the sales/assets ratio  (lnsales/assets), while it is positively and significantly related to the firm’s
debt/assets ratio (lndebt/assets). With respect to credit history, the cost of credit is positively
related to an unfavorable credit situation (situation*) and to bounced checks at the marginal bank
(lnbounced/liabilities). However, in the case of credit situation the coefficients are not always
significant, and they do not increase with the deterioration of the credit situation. Relationship
variables show that the cost of credit is negatively and significantly associated with debt
concentration at the marginal bank (liabilities bank/system), and to the number of accounts at the
marginal bank (no. credit lines), but it is positively and significantly related to the number of
banks (no. banks). While Table 11 shows that the number of banks increases with the size of
liabilities in the financial system, the regressions control for the size of firms (lnassets), so a size
effect can be ruled out. Other significant controls show that less collateral
(unwarranted/overdrafts) leads to higher interest rates. Marginal banks that are wholesale
(wholesale bank) or large (bank’s market share) charge lower interest rates, and marginal banks
that are foreign (foreign bank) charge higher interest rates.
4
The effects of credit history merit further comment. The variable for bounced checks is
measured as the ratio in the marginal bank between the amount in bounced checks from January
to September 2000, and liabilities. There are five dummy variables for the credit situation of
each firm. Situation 1 is omitted, so it acts as the benchmark. Although not all parameters are
                                                          
3 All the variables defined as lnx are calculated adding 1,000 pesos to x, so ln(1+x) is the actual explanatory
variable. This transformation is due to the many zeros that appear in the regression with the complete sample.
Otherwise we would lose a large number of observations. A full description of the right-hand variables appears in
Appendix D.
4 The dummies for type of bank might in part capture characteristics of firms, e.g., prime firms tend to operate with
large banks. It is not clear why foreign banks charge higher rates. Though Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga
(2001) find that foreign banks charge higher spreads than domestic banks in developing countries, they do not
specifically relate it to higher loan rates.30
significantly different from zero in the four estimates, all of the coefficients are positive. This
indicates that firms with poor credit histories tend to pay higher interest rates. Furthermore, if
only a dummy for credit situation 1 is included, it is negative and statistically significant (we do
not show the regression due to space considerations). Interest rates do not increase as the credit
situation worsens to situation 4, which corresponds to firms under debt rescheduling
proceedings, or situation 5, which corresponds to firms filing for bankruptcy. Since situation 6 is
a technical category that represents arrears with financial institutions that went bankrupt, it
cannot be ranked as worse than either situation 4 or 5. These results may be interpreted as an
indication of credit rationing. As the risk of default increases, beyond a certain point it makes no
sense to increase the interest rate further. Rather, banks will simply cut back the amount of
credit, as we discuss below.
As for the relationship variables, the variable liabilities bank/system is an indication of
how deep the marginal bank’s involvement in the firm is. An increase in this variable means that
the bank has a higher stake in the firm. This higher exposure assumed by a bank also generates
the incentive to monitor the firm more closely. On the other hand, it could possibly indicate that
the firm does not have access to other banks. In this case the parameter of this variable should
have a positive sign, signaling the firm’s risk. According to Table 12, the effect of debt
concentration at the marginal bank is explained by the first hypothesis.
A second variable to control for relationships, no. credit lines, is the number of accounts
the firm has at the marginal bank. Each type of bank account generates different information.
Although not all accounts are informative, we consider the total number of accounts as a proxy
for informative accounts. The results of the regressions show that firms with more accounts are
charged lower interest rates.
A third variable for relationships, no. banks, does not have a straightforward sign. The
issues are similar to the variable liabilities bank/system.
5 On the one hand, this variable could
signal that a firm wants to diversify its financing sources so as not to be a captive client of a
single bank. If this is the case, an increase in the number of banks should reduce the interest rate.
On the other hand, this variable could signal that the relationship is weaker, in which case an
                                                          
5 Note that the number of banks (no. banks) is not completely independent from the concentration of business at the
marginal bank (liabilities bank/system). This is emphatically so when no. banks=1, which implies liabilities
bank/system=1. However, the mean value of no. bank in regression 4 is 5.1 banks. Furthermore, the two variables do
not have a very high positive correlation.31
increase in the number of banks should go hand in hand with an increase in the interest rate paid.
The interest rate paid could also rise if more banks signaled that the marginal bank cannot
monitor the firm as effectively, or also if the marginal firmsignals that the main bank cut the
firm’s access to credit, forcing that firm to seek other lenders. According to the results in Table
12, firms that deal with more banks are charged higher interest rates, which signals either weaker
relationships or moral hazard and quality problems. Taking into account the quantity effects to
be discussed below, the additional effects of the variable no. banks may indeed be an indication
that firms need to seek financing from  another bank because they are cut off by their main
lender.
In addition to the basic regressions in Table 12, we ran alternative regressions using our
preferred set of firms (validation criteria 1/2/3/5/7/13).







roa 0.075 0.079 0.080 0.080
(1.07) (1.13) (1.14) (1.15)
lnassets -0.129 -0.120 -0.120 -0.119
(-6.98)*** (-6.39)*** (-6.41)*** (-6.36)***
lnsales/assets -0.180 -0.176 -0.178 -0.173
(-2.68)*** (-2.64)*** (-2.66)*** (-2.59)***
lndebt/assets 0.452 0.437 0.441 0.445
(2.45)** (2.37)** (2.39)** (2.41)**
sector 0 0.020 0.033 0.034 0.027
(0.19) (0.32) (0.32) (0.26)
sector 1 0.110 0.111 0.111 0.100
(1.22) (1.23) (1.23) (1.11)
sector 3 -0.237 -0.249 -0.249 -0.249
(-0.87) (-0.92) (-0.91) (-0.91)
sector 5 -0.244 -0.234 -0.234 -0.237
(-0.96) (-0.92) (-0.92) (-0.93)
sector 6 0.220 0.210 0.211 0.209
(2.09)** (2.00)** (2.01)** (1.99)**
sector 7 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.011
(-0.04) (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.15)
sector 8 0.198 0.195 0.195 0.182
(2.54)** (2.51)** (2.51)** (2.39)**
situation 2 0.577 0.525 0.504 0.505
(3.72)*** (3.38)*** (3.16)*** (3.17)***
situation 3 0.084 0.014 0.000 0.004
(0.56) (0.09) (0.00) (0.02)
situation 4 0.475 0.379 0.376 0.394
(4.45)*** (3.46)*** (3.43)*** (3.59)***
situation 5 0.205 0.178 0.160 0.174
(1.23) (1.07) (0.95) (1.03)
situation 6 0.767 0.695 0.645 0.630
(1.91)* (1.73)* (1.57) (1.53)
lnbounced/liabilities 0.066 0.049 0.049 0.048
(4.67)*** (3.31)*** (3.34)*** (3.24)***
unwarranted/overdrafts  0.963 0.971 0.973 0.973
(6.90)*** (6.96)*** (6.98)*** (6.98)***
foreign bank=1 0.146 0.157 0.157 0.162
(2.55)** (2.75)*** (2.74)*** (2.83)***
public bank=1 0.261 0.262 0.263 0.247
(1.63) (1.64) (1.65)* (1.54)
wholesale bank=1 -1.011 -1.004 -1.005 -1.007
(-8.90)*** (-8.85)*** (-8.86)*** (-8.88)***
bank's market share -8.724 -8.749 -8.771 -8.864
(-10.36)*** (-10.41)*** (-10.42)*** (-10.52)***
liabilities bank/system -0.646 -0.624 -0.623 -0.720
(-6.45)*** (-6.23)*** (-6.22)*** (-6.63)***
no. banks 0.090 0.086 0.086 0.033
(8.89)*** (8.46)*** (8.47)*** (1.32)
no. credit lines -0.142 -0.139 -0.140 -0.133
(-5.37)*** (-5.27)*** (-5.28)*** (-5.00)***
_cons 3.396 3.282 3.285 3.444
(14.33)*** (13.76)*** (13.76)*** (13.87)***
bounced other bank=1 - 0.295 0.297 0.308
- (3.79)*** (3.81)*** (3.95)***
system situation (-1,0,1) - - -0.049 -0.049
-- (-0.58) (-0.58)
no. banks square --- 0 . 0 0 3
---( 2 . 3 1 ) * *
Number of obs. 3963 3963 3963 3963
F 33.52 32.89 31.68 30.77
Prob > F 0 0 0 0
R-squared 0.1755 0.1785 0.1786 0.1797
Adj R-squared 0.1703 0.1731 0.1729 0.1738
Root MSE 1.5897 1.5871 1.5872 1.5863
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS
 
+
Validation Criteria 1/2/3/5/7/13 in Appendix A.
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. 1, 2  and 3 asterisks indicate significance at 10%, 5% or 1%.
Interest Rate Regressions: Additional Variables33
The only significant change in Table 13 is that when a quadratic term for number of
banks is introduced (no. banks square), the linear term, though still positive, loses its statistical
significance. The quadratic term is positive and significant, so the effect of the number of banks
is convex, leading to increasingly higher marginal rates. If anything, this confirms the
interpretation of the number of banks as a distress signal, where a firm that is more needy of
funds faces steeply increasing financing costs at the margin.
A dummy variable for bounced checks at other banks (bounced other bank) turns out to
be significant, though this was not public information released at the time by the BCRA. It only
became public in mid-2001. Bounced check records might perhaps have been shared among
banks, or revealed by clearing houses. There is a dummy for differences between the rating of
the firm by the marginal bank and in the median of the financial system, system situation, which
took a value of 1 if the median situation in the system was worse, and –1 if it was better.  This
variable turned out to be not statistically significant.
4.2. Leverage
Measuring access to credit is not an easy task. Leverage is commonly used in the applied
literature. We experimented with the ratio of several different measures of debt to assets, from
broader ones to more restricted ones. The dependent variable was one of four measures of a
firm’s debt ratio:
-  lndebt/assets:  natural log of [1+(debt/assets) ]
-  lnliabilities/a.:  log of [1+(bank liabilities/assets) ]
-  lnloans/a.:  log of [1+(bank loans/assets) ]
-  lnoverdraft/a.:  log of [1+(bank overdrafts/assets) ]
Except for the first variable, where liabilities and assets are taken from balance sheets at
the same point in time, in the other cases there is some noise. We divide a figure of debt with the
financial system in October 2000 by the assets reported in the last available balance sheet
statement. The balance sheet information is mostly from 1998 and 1999. But since the economy
on average has not grown since 1998 due to a prolonged slump (followed by a strong downward
slide in 2001), it is not clear that there is any bias. Table 14 shows the estimates with one of the
sub-samples. The results with the complete sample of firms are similar.34
Table 14.
Explanatory variables lndebt/assets lnliabilities/a. lnloans/a. lnoverdrafts/a.
roa -0.009 0.055 0.055 0.003
(-1.52) (3.51)*** (3.44)*** (0.17)
lnassets 0.009 -0.133 -0.135 -0.069
(6.81)*** (-37.40)*** (-36.44)*** (-19.02)***
lnsales/assets 0.112 -0.142 -0.124 -0.030
(23.14)*** (-11.42)*** (-9.68)*** (-2.47)**
sector 0 -0.002 -0.032 -0.035 -0.010
(-0.26) (-1.51) (-1.66)* (-0.51)
sector 1 -0.016 -0.040 -0.034 -0.008
(-2.31)** (-2.27)** (-1.84)* (-0.43)
sector 3 -0.043 -0.022 -0.040 0.016
(-1.98)** (-0.41) (-0.69) (0.3)
sector 5 -0.021 0.230 0.237 0.044
(-1.15) (5.00)*** (4.96)*** (0.89)
sector 6 0.010 0.045 0.049 0.023
(1.26) (2.18)** (2.29)** (1.12)
sector 7 0.019 -0.008 -0.013 -0.019
(3.39)*** (-0.57) (-0.87) (-1.35)
sector 8 0.020 0.037 0.022 -0.004
(3.49)*** (2.49)** (1.43) (-0.27)
situation 2 0.061 0.010 0.026 -0.072
(6.16)*** (0.38) (1.01) (-2.68)***
situation 3 0.071 -0.045 -0.020 -0.048
(6.33)*** (-1.57) (-0.67) (-1.56)
situation 4 0.051 -0.052 -0.032 -0.034
(6.31)*** (-2.53)** (-1.51) (-1.59)
situation 5 0.047 0.009 -0.113 -0.130
(5.02)*** (0.36) (-4.31)*** (-4.52)***
situation 6 0.065 0.496 0.444 0.484
(2.57)** (7.53)*** (6.48)*** (7.78)***
lnbounced/liabilities 0.001 -0.013 -0.010 0.007
(0.68) (-3.14)*** (-2.49)** (1.92)*
guarantees=1 0.008 -0.011 0.006 -0.071
(1.86)* (-0.98) (0.50) (-6.58)***
foreign bank=1 0.013 0.039 0.054 0.096
(2.95)*** (3.37)*** (4.46)*** (8.58)***
public bank=1 -0.003 0.044 0.069 -0.188
(-0.38) (2.43)** (3.71)*** (-8.78)***
wholesale bank=1 0.019 0.107 0.091 -0.007
(2.24)** (5.02)*** (4.10)*** (-0.34)
bank's market share 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.017
(0.12) (0.13) (-0.04) (-10.56)***
liabilities bank/system 0.038 0.266 0.347 0.084
(3.62)*** (9.96)*** (12.20)*** (3.04)***
no. banks 0.004 0.035 0.041 0.020
(4.26)*** (14.72)*** (16.52)*** (8.43)***
no. credit lines 0.001 0.010 0.024 0.084
(0.47) (2.25)** (5.03)*** (18.32)***
_cons 0.181 1.026 0.876 0.230
(11.22)*** (24.77)*** (20.27)*** (5.48)***
Number of obs 5,860 5,860 5,860 5,860
LR chi2 851 1,528 1,514 1,263
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R2 -0.17 0.22 0.21 0.24
Log likelihood  2,810 -2,660 -2,834 -1,996
Estimation method Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
 
+
Validation Criteria 1/2/3/5/7/13 in Appendix A.
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. 1, 2 and 3 asterisks indicate significance at 10%, 5% or 1%.
Debt-Ratio Regressions
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Petersen and Rajan (1994) point out that estimates where the dependent variable is some
measure of a firm’s debt ratio suffer from identification problems. Changes in the debt ratio can
be due to changes in the demand for credit (the supply curve is observed) or to changes in the
supply of credit (the demand curve is observed). For example, they expect credit availability to
be greater for higher quality firms, and in this sense they find that larger firms tend to have a
high debt-to-asset ratio. However, older firms and more profitable firms (which they also expect
to be higher quality) have lower, not higher, debt ratios. The problem is that it is difficult to tell,
for instance, whether older firms are rationed by creditors (a supply effect), or whether they have
a lower demand for external credit. For that reason, Petersen and Rajan discard indebtedness as a
measure of credit availability, turning instead to percentage of discounts on trade credit taken by
the firm.
In this sense, the signs in Table 14 are very sensitive to which definition is chosen. Firms
in bad credit situations tend to be highly indebted, which seems to indicate a demand factor
related to financial distress. On the other hand, bank credit tends to be smaller when the credit
situation deteriorates (except for situation 6, a special technical category). This is particularly
clear for overdrafts and seems to indicate a supply effect, i.e., that firms are cut off from credit
by banks. While good firms may need to resort less to overdrafts, a supply factor such as
willingness to lend can reduce the amount of overdrafts available to bad firms. Thus, overdrafts
have the same problems of identification as indicators of indebtedness.
Another example is the sales/assets ratio, which has a positive sign in the first column.,
This can be interpreted as meaning that firms with good investment opportunities have greater
access to credit. The negative sign for the other columns is not necessarily an inconsistency,
since it could mean that the firm does not need to resort to more credit from the domestic
banking system, substituting it for other forms of credit. However, if that is so, what is being
measured now is a demand effect, not availability of funds. There are several other examples
along these lines.
Additional complications arise with the use of these ratios as measures of access to credit.
In accordance with the results of other studies, the debt/asset ratio rises with the size of the firm
(lnassets). On the other hand, the reliance on bank credit—by any of its definitions—falls, as one
would expect if SMEs are the firms most reliant on banking relationships for finance. Hence,
there are composition effects. Though larger firms rely less on bank debt, they more than36
compensate for this with non-bank sources of finance. Thus, the ratio of bank liabilities to assets,
which might appear promising as a measure of access to credit because it includes not only loans
drawn but also the total of loans granted, loses its appeal due to this composition effect. If we
had a figure not only of actual debt, but also of overall potential credit, the picture might be
different.
In summary, it is hard to sort out demand and supply effects in Table 14. The procedure
of using debt-to-assets ratios to estimate access to credit is the one typically used in the applied
literature. A series of instruments and econometric procedures are applied to get around the
simultaneity problems. In this regard, the work of Gallego and Loayza (2000) represents current
best practices.
We propose a different procedure to get around these problems. We single out unused
credit lines, something that can be related to Petersen and Rajan’s idea of why “Discounts
Taken” is informative in relation to credit constraints. Their firms had the possibility of using
trade credit to finance their purchases, paying 20 days later and forsaking a 2 percent discount. If
a firm decides to pay earlier to get a discount, it has a less expensive credit line available in the
financial system. Alternatively, it could also have lots of cash on hand so its demand for external
funds is low. The measure of percentage of discounts taken on trade credits devised by Petersen
and Rajan (1994) does not isolate demand and supply factors. What it achieves, instead, is an
indicator that is not affected in the same direction by both factors. Better quality firms are
offered more credit in the financial system, so for supply reasons these firms have to resort less
to trade credit. But if a firm demanded more funds, it would eventually have to resort more to
trade credit, so this cannot be confused with an outward supply shift, as could happen with the
figures on indebtedness discussed above. Therefore, a dependent variable that displayed the same
behavior as discounts taken could work. Unused credit lines provides such a variable.
4.3. Proportion of Unused Credit Lines in Main Bank
To avoid the problems that leverage presents as a measure of availability of credit, we turn to
unused credit lines in the financial system. In principle this indicates not how much credit a firm
has used, but rather how much it has available through loan commitment contracts.
We started to work with unused credit lines at the system level. However, we prefer to
focus here on an alternative formulation where the dependent variable is the portion of unused37
credit lines in the main bank, i.e., the bank where the largest share of liabilities is concentrated.
The characteristics of the lender correspond to the main bank, except for the few cases in which
two banks were tied in first place, wherein we included both. This allows for a better estimation
of the effect of the relationship variables, since variables taken from the main bank are weaker at
explaining available credit lines on a system-wide basis, and it makes no sense to define some of
our relationship variables in terms of the whole system.
Our hypothesis was that unused credit lines indicate a firm that is not credit constrained,
while the opposite represents a firm that is. Therefore, the estimation should consider both zeros
and the non-zero unused credit lines, because both are informative. The following formulation
captures the access to credit as the amount of unused credit lines granted by financial institutions
to firms:
Unused Credit Line in Main Bank =  β 0 + β 1 Firm specific information  +
  β 2  Industry  dummies  +  β 3 loan and lender characteristics + β 4 Credit history +
β 5 Measure of relationships  +  ε 0
We used a standard two-part selection model.
6 The model was estimated by both full
information maximum likelihood and the Heckman two-step procedure. On one hand, the
likelihood function for the normal selection model is well known to be numerically difficult to
handle, which calls for two-stage methods. On the other hand, as in the case of this paper, when
the selection equation shares many explanatory variables with the regression equation, the
identification of the second stage of Heckman’s method may suffer from very high
multicollinearity between the explanatory variables in the regression equation and the additional
regressor included to correct for the selection bias. We use both methods to handle this issue and
compare estimation results. We show the results of the Heckman two-step procedure, but
estimates using both methods do not differ substantially (see Nawata and Nagase, 1996, for more
details on estimating selection models). Consistent standard errors for the selection model are
computed as in Greene (1997, p. 981).
                                                          
6 Initially, since the dependent variable is limited to the [0,1] closed interval, parameters were estimated as in
Petersen and Rajan (1994) using a two-limit Tobit specification. This specification implicitly assumes, in terms of
the general selectivity model, that the regression equation is also the selection equation. In this final version, by
allowing these two equations to differ we can distinguish between two effects. First, what determines whether a firm
has an unused credit line or not (a 0/1 decision). Second, of those firms with unused credit lines, what determines the
amount of unused credit lines. The determinants turn out to be similar in both steps. Hence, at least qualitatively,
results of the selectivity model replicate those of our initial two-limit Tobit specification.38
Table 15 presents the results of the regression equation, while the selection equation is
discussed in Appendix E.1.39
Table 15.
Explanatory variables Complete sample Complete sample
+ Reduced sample
++ Reduced sample 
+++
roa 0.003 0.002 0.119 0.140
(0.88) (0.48) (1.14) (1.78)*
lnassets 0.063 0.083 0.096 0.090
(5.16)*** (11.05)*** (7.78)*** (8.81)***
lnsales/assets 0.117 0.147 0.100 0.105
(4.50)*** (5.50)*** (2.10)** (2.73)***
lndebt/assets -0.096 -0.130 -0.279 -0.253
(-1.80)* (-2.32)** (-2.25)** (-2.54)**
sector 0 -0.045 0.000 -0.022 -0.047
(-0.94) (-0.01) (-0.29) (-0.86)
sector 1 -0.269 -0.222 -0.222 -0.219
(-4.25)*** (-6.44)*** (-3.71)*** (-4.47)***
sector 3 0.104 0.145 0.286 0.204
(1.03) (1.37) (1.71)* (1.43)
sector 5 -0.055 -0.085 -0.042 -0.065
(-0.54) (-0.80) (-0.29) (-0.48)
sector 6 -0.026 -0.007 0.002 -0.036
(-0.59) (-0.16) (0.03) (-0.62)
sector 7 -0.083 -0.092 -0.070 -0.092
(-1.67)* (-2.89)*** (-1.42) (-2.20)**
sector 8 -0.068 -0.069 -0.063 -0.081
(-1.42) (-2.14)** (-1.25) (-1.90)*
situation 2 -0.299 -0.259 -0.286 -0.257
(-5.17)*** (-4.58)*** (-2.78)*** (-2.81)***
situation 3 -0.457 -0.461 -0.663 -0.617
(-5.58)*** (-5.61)*** (-4.44)*** (-4.61)***
situation 4 -0.774 -0.790 -0.845 -0.802
(-7.20)*** (-10.20)*** (-6.97)*** (-7.17)***
situation 5 -0.773 -0.730 -0.804 -0.778
(-5.73)*** (-7.05)*** (-5.01)*** (-5.39)***
situation 6 -0.606 -0.720 -0.388 -0.395
(-2.85)*** (-2.89)*** (-1.51) (-1.56)
lnbounced/liabilities -0.040 -0.047 -0.047 -0.038
(-3.61)*** (-4.29)*** (-2.24)** (-2.26)**
guarantees/liabilities  0.427 0.429 0.475 0.475
(8.25)*** (8.27)*** (5.30)*** (6.10)***
foreign bank=1 -0.012 -0.022 0.007 -0.003
(-0.40) (-0.86) (0.16) (-0.08)
public bank=1 0.069 0.061 0.081 0.057
(2.15)** (1.74)* (1.32) (1.11)
wholesale bank=1 0.247 0.259 0.293 0.303
(5.38)*** (5.18)*** (4.24)*** (4.75)***
bank's market share 0.029 0.032 0.032 0.035
(5.84)*** (9.09)*** (5.86)*** (7.31)***
liabilities bank/system 0.214 0.197 0.238 0.187
- (3.20)*** (2.43)** (2.27)**
no. banks -0.027 -0.031 -0.030 -0.033
(-7.28)*** (-5.45)*** (-3.92)*** (-4.70)***
no. credit lines 0.132 0.129 0.124 0.115
(6.90)*** (12.91)*** (8.00)*** (8.73)***
_cons -1.394 -1.582 -1.646 -1.523
- (-16.50)*** (-10.74)*** (-11.82)***
Number of obs 15,822 11,772 4,426 5,860
Censored obs 11,679 8,242 3,078 3,998
Uncensored obs 4,143 3,530 1,348 1,862
Wald chi2 4,186 876 380 481
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log likelihood  -8,313 -6,880 -2,629 -3,514
Estimation method Heckman sel. mod. Heckman sel. mod. Heckman sel. mod. Heckman sel. mod.
 
+
 Excludes roa=0 and balance sheets with problems.
 
++ 
Validation Criteria 1/2/3/5/7 in Appendix A.
 
+++
 Validation Criteria 1/2/3/5/7/13 in Appendix A.
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis. 1,2 and 3 asterisks indicate significance at 10%, 5% or 1%.
Unused Credit Ratio Regression Equations: Different Sub-samples40
With regard to firm characteristics, the availability of credit is positively and significantly
associated with the amount of assets (lnassets), the sales/assets ration (lnsales/assets), and—in
the last regression equation—the return on assets (roa). It is negatively and significantly
associated with the debt-to-assets ratio (lndebt/assets). At the main bank, a worse credit situation
(situation*) is negatively and significantly associated with less credit availability, and the same
happens with bounced checks (lnbounced/liabilities). The relationship variables show that credit
availability is positively and significantly associated with more debt concentration at the main
bank (liabilities bank/system), and with the use of more accounts at the main bank (no. credit
lines), and it is negatively and significantly associated with the number of banks (no. banks).
Finally, more collateral (guarantees/liabilities) and having a main bank that is wholesale
(wholesale bank) or large (bank’s market share) is significantly related to more credit
availability.
Some issues related to the interpretation of these results require further clarification.
Petersen and Rajan divide firm characteristics into investment opportunities, which should
reduce credit availability, and measures of cash flow, which should increase it. They admit that
the dividing line is not always clear, and the effect may be a priori ambiguous (e.g., return over
assets and sales over assets can be considered either as measures of internal cash flow or as
measures of investment opportunities). However, these distinctions may not matter at all: if
banks see that the firm has larger investment opportunities, they may be willing to lend more.
Indeed, as Galindo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (2001) show, an efficient financial system will try to
channel funds to firms with more profitable investment opportunities. The proxies they use for
investment opportunities are return over assets and sales over assets, precisely the variables that
Petersen and Rajan consider might reduce credit availability. As far as these investment
opportunities are common knowledge to both parts, because they can be inferred from the
accounting statements of firms, this should increase the supply of funds coming from profit
maximizing financial institutions. Hence, these arguments should lead one to expect return over
assets and sales over assets to unambiguously increase the availability of credit, which is exactly
what happens in our estimates.
A possible shortcoming of our line of reasoning is that good firms with a large amount of
cash might be excluded.  They simply might not need, and therefore would not apply for, line of
credit contracts in the first place. Thus, obviously they would not have unused credit lines.  In41
this regard, large firms immediately come to mind, since they are identified in the literature with
good quality firms. Incidentally, it has been shown that larger firms are firms that are less likely
to be credit constrained (Schiantarelli, 1996). However, with the regression equation Table 15
shows that larger firms have more unused credit lines available than small firms (large firms are
also more likely to have unused credit lines, according to the selection equation in the
Appendix). This happens despite the fact that large firms in Argentina might have fewer
incentives to sign loan commitment contracts with domestic banks, because their access to
cheaper credit abroad decreases their dependence on the domestic financial system. This seems
to support our conjecture that firms that are not credit constrained have unused bank credit
available.
It remains to be seen if this result is robust in other datasets.  For instance, if our measure
of unused credit lines is introduced into the interest rate regressions, it is significantly and
negatively related to marginal interest rates. This is sensible if one thinks that firms that are cut
off from credit by their main bank have to “shop around,” and  other banks may be more
expensive. However, using data from the Italian Centrale dei Rischi, which distinguishes
between banks loans granted and bank loans drawn, D’Auria, Foglia, and Marullo-Reedtz (1999)
find the opposite. The share of loans drawn is negatively related to the rate of interest, which
means that firms with fewer unused credit lines pay lower interest rates. A difference between
their study and ours is that we look at the interest rate in the marginal bank, whereas they explain
the interest rate at each bank, and study the effect of unused credit lines available in that same
bank. However, a priori we would also have expected a firm to exhaust its cheaper sources of
funds at a bank first, so it is hard to make sense of their results on the cost of credit. In summary,
though the proportion of unused credit lines in total bank liabilities might be easier to replicate
for a wider number of countries than the indirect measures drawn from trade credit by Petersen
and Rajan (1994), it remains to be seen if unused bank credit turns out to be a sensible indicator
of credit availability, as seems to be the case for the firms in our sample from Argentina.
As in the case of the cost of credit, we re-estimated the regression equations with some







roa 0.140 0.134 0.142 0.141
(1.78)* (1.72)* (1.82)* (1.85)*
lnassets 0.090 0.086 0.086 0.086
(8.81)*** (8.45)*** (8.43)*** (8.64)***
lnsales/assets 0.105 0.104 0.103 0.100
(2.73)*** (2.73)*** (2.68)*** (2.67)***
lndebt/assets -0.253 -0.249 -0.248 -0.240
(-2.54)** (-2.52)** (-2.51)** (-2.49)**
sector 0 -0.047 -0.049 -0.051 -0.056
(-0.86) (-0.91) (-0.95) (-1.06)
sector 1 -0.219 -0.220 -0.221 -0.223
(-4.46)*** (-4.50)*** (-4.51)*** (-4.66)***
sector 3 0.204 0.207 0.210 0.210
(1.43) (1.46) (1.48) (1.51)
sector 5 -0.065 -0.058 -0.059 -0.069
(-0.48) (-0.43) (-0.44) (-0.52)
sector 6 -0.036 -0.022 -0.021 -0.017
(-0.62) (-0.38) (-0.36) (-0.3)
sector 7 -0.092 -0.089 -0.089 -0.091
(-2.20)** (-2.12)** (-2.14)** (-2.22)**
sector 8 -0.081 -0.076 -0.077 -0.080
(-1.90)* (-1.78)* (-1.81)* (-1.91)*
situation 2 -0.257 -0.235 -0.305 -0.300
(-2.81)*** (-2.57)*** (-2.98)*** (-2.99)***
situation 3 -0.617 -0.578 -0.618 -0.599
(-4.61)*** (-4.32)*** (-4.36)*** (-4.32)***
situation 4 -0.802 -0.730 -0.745 -0.716
(-7.17)*** (-6.41)*** (-6.49)*** (-6.38)***
situation 5 -0.778 -0.743 -0.788 -0.772
(-5.39)*** (-5.16)*** (-5.37)*** (-5.39)***
situation 6 -0.395 -0.353 -0.453 -0.438
(-1.56) (-1.41) (-1.74)* (-1.72)*
lnbounced/liabilities -0.038 -0.024 -0.022 -0.022
(-2.26)** (-1.45) (-1.29) (-1.31)
guarantees/liabilities  0.475 0.474 0.473 0.477
(6.10)*** (6.12)*** (6.09)*** (6.30)***
foreign bank=1 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 0.003
(-0.08) (-0.13) (-0.12) (0.08)
public bank=1 0.057 0.060 0.061 0.065
(1.11) (1.16) (1.19) (1.29)
wholesale bank=1 0.303 0.307 0.307 0.301
(4.75)*** (4.83)*** (4.81)*** (4.84)***
bank's market share 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.032
(7.31)*** (7.17)*** (7.14)*** (6.97)***
liabilities bank/system 0.187 0.175 0.177 0.055
(2.27)** (2.13)** (2.15)** (0.61)
no. banks -0.033 -0.031 -0.031 -0.071
(-4.70)*** (-4.42)*** (-4.41)*** (-4.47)***
no. credit lines 0.115 0.114 0.114 0.112
(8.73)*** (8.66)*** (8.67)*** (8.64)***
_cons -1.523 -1.470 -1.471 -1.258
(-11.82)*** (-11.43)*** (-11.41)*** (-9.07)***
bounced other bank=1 - -0.192 -0.193 -0.183
- (-3.45)*** (-3.44)*** (-3.34)***
system situation (-1,0,1) - - -0.127 -0.130
- - (-1.72)* (-1.80)*
no. banks square --- 0 . 0 0 2
--- (2.85)***
Number of observations 5,860 5,860 5,860 5,860
Censored obs 3,998 3,998 3,998 3,998
Uncensored obs 1,862 1,862 1,862 1,862
Wald chi2 481 490 488 496
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log likelihood -3,514 -3,497 -3,495 -3,457
Estimation method Heckman sel. mod. Heckman sel. mod. Heckman sel. mod. Heckman sel. mod.
 
+++
Validation Criteria 1/2/3/5/7/13 in Appendix A.
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis. 1,2 and 3 asterisks indicate significance at 10%, 5% or 1%.
Unused Credit Ratio Regression Equations: Additional Variables43
To control for a possible non-linearity of number of banks, we introduced a quadratic
term. This term was positive and significant. Simulating the composite effect of changing the
number of banks, one finds the following:
Table 17.
Percentile no. banks Composite effect
11 - 0 . 0 6 9








Source: Table 16, regression four.
Effect of Number of Banks on Credit Availability
The negative effect of banks on available credit increases as the number of banks rises,
reaching a minimum when no. banks = 18. After that, the value starts rising. However, 99
percent of the firms do business with 15 banks or fewer.
The dummy for bounced checks from other banks is significant and negative, but it
makes the bounced checks at the main bank lose significance. The variable on system situation is
significant, indicating that if the median rating in the system is worse, then available credit at the
main bank is smaller, and if it is rated better, available credit is larger (we did not create two
separate variables to see if effects were asymmetric). This suggests that the credit situations
reported in Central de Deudores have an impact on credit constraints, and the public credit
register helps to ease problems of asymmetric information.
In summary, we interpret our two-step procedure as providing evidence that non-credit
constrained firms have unused credit lines available in the financial system, and that a larger
proportion of unused credit available is an indication of easier access to credit. More precisely,
when the credit limits in loan commitment contracts are exhausted, the firm faces an intensive
credit constraint.44
4.4. Economic Significance
We now evaluate the economic significance of the parameters that are statistically significant,
using regression equation 3 of Table 16 to estimate the impacts on the access to credit, and
regression 3 in Table 13 to estimate the impacts on the cost of credit.
Table 18 presents the economic significance of the parameters estimated using the
quantity regression, where the first column is the estimated parameter times the mean of the
variable, and the second column is derived multiplying the estimated variable times the mean
plus two standard deviations.  For dummy variables, the table measures a switch from 0 to 1. The
dependent variable varies between zero and one.
Table 18.
(Mean+2 std.dev.) Effect of
*parameter treatment (%)
roa 0.0059 0.0966 9
lnassets 0.7276 1.0149 29
lnsales/assets 0.0736 0.1651 9
lndebt/assets -0.1028 -0.1823 -8
situation 2 -0.3050 -31
situation 3 -0.6180 -62
situation 4 -0.7450 -75
situation 5 -0.7880 -79
situation 6 -0.4530 -45
guarantees/liabilities  0.0063 0.0914 9
wholesale bank=1 0.3070 31
bank's market share 0.1483 0.3969 25
liabilities bank/system 0.1158 0.2114 10
no.banks -0.1310 -0.3275 -20
no. credit lines 0.2556 0.5492 29
bounced other bank=1 -0.1927 -19
system situation (-1,0,1) 0.0318 -0.0529 -8
Source: Calculated using regression equation three from Table 16.
Explanatory variable Mean * parameter
Economic Significance of Variables Affecting Credit Availability
The table shows that the main factor affecting the amount of credit available is the credit
situation of the firm. A firm’s access to credit decreases sharply when the credit situation
worsens, except for situation 6 (which is a technical category that is not worse than 4 or 5). Close
relationships are quite important for access to credit: there is a positive effect from doing more
business with the main bank, and having a larger number of credit lines there, and a negative one45
of working with many banks, a signal of a more distant relationship. The no. banks variable
indeed reinforces the effect of the liabilities bank/system variable. Also significant is that large
firms and firms that operate with wholesale banks and large banks (which may also provide an
indication that these are prime firms) have more credit available.
Table 19 shows the economic significance of the interest rate regression parameters,
measuring the price effects in basis points.
Table 19.
(Mean+2 std.dev.) Effect of
*parameter treatment (b.p.)
roa 066
lnassets -103 -142 -39
lnsales/assets -13 -29 -15
lndebt/assets 19 32 13
situation 2 50 50
situation 3 00
situation 4 38 38
situation 5 16 16
situation 6 65 65
lnbounced/liabilities 32 1 1 9
unwarranted/overdrafts 93 130 36
foreign bank=1 16 16
wholesale bank=1 -100 -100
bank's market share -37 -100 -63
liabilities bank/system -19 -60 -41
no. banks 44 101 57
no. credit lines -32 -66 -34
bounced other bank=1 30 30
system situation (-1,0,1) 0- 3- 3
SourceCalculated using regression three from Table 13.
Explanatory variable Mean * parameter
Economic Significance of Variables Affecting Cost of Credit
Though we have not emphasized lender characteristics, the main explanatory factor is
whether a firm works with a wholesale bank or not, which is related to a reduction of 100 basis
points in the interest rate. Many wholesale banks tend to work with affiliates of multinational
corporations, so this may capture characteristics of the clients they chose. Working with a large
bank is also very important in obtaining lower rates. Hence, becoming a client of the right type
of bank seems relevant, and there appears to be some matching between types of firms and types
of banks. In relation to a firm’s credit situation, after passing situation 2 there is no strong
punishment in terms of interest rates (situation 6 is a special technical category for firms in46
arrears with failed banks). Bounced checks lead to appreciably more expensive credit.
Relationship variables are again quite important, despite the fact that we control for credit history
(authors such as Greene, 1992, expect that variable to wipe out the significance of other types of
information in credit scoring).
The joint information from Tables 17 and 18 suggests the existence of equilibrium credit
constraints in Argentina’s formal credit market. The parameters for a firm’s situation variable
suggest that the firm faces a quantity effect that is stronger than the price effect as the credit
situation deteriorates. The relationship variables affect appreciably both quantities and prices. A
close relationship is related to more access to credit and to lower marginal interest rates.
5. Implications
We built a cross-section of data for October 2000 to study the variation of both the cost of credit
and the access of firms to credit. We study in particular how banks use different pieces of private
and public information to screen firms and overcome informational asymmetries in the credit
market. Some private information is transferable, such as balance sheet data. Private information
generated in relationships is not. We also consider public information available in the Central de
Deudores.
We use something very specific to measure the marginal cost of credit, the interest rate
charged on marginal (most expensive) bank overdrafts. To measure access of firms to credit, our
first intention was to use the percentage of authorized overdrafts effectively drawn. The overdraft
authorizations are a loan commitment contract or credit line. However, we then came up with a
more comprehensive measure: unused credit lines over total financial system liabilities. This is
the other side of trade credit if, as Petersen and Rajan conjecture, firms with credit in the
financial system do not resort to trade credit and pay early in order to get a discount. It is also
related to the loan commitment contracts in Melnik and Plaut (1986) in the sense that firms that
have exhausted their bank commitments have to look for more expensive credit elsewhere.
We find that the cost of credit is smaller for a firm with a close relationship to the
marginal bank, where a close relationship is linked to a large share of credit and a large number
of accounts in the marginal bank, and to a small number of total banks. Firms with large assets, a
high sales/assets ratio, and a low debt/assets ratio pay a lower interest rate at the margin. A good
credit history (no debt arrears and no bounced checks) and collateral also reduce the marginal47
interest rate. Though credit history matters, as Greene (1992) emphasizes, it is not the only
factor. It does not wipe out the significance of the relationship variables, which are extremely
important.
Using the proportion of unused credit lines at the main bank as a measure of firms that
are not credit constrained, we find that a good credit situation increases the availability of credit,
and that relationships are also very important to increase the access to credit. Our proxies for
relationships might signal that banks have private information indicating the firm to be a good
credit risk rather than a “lemon” (otherwise, why extend the firm more credit?). Our measure of
unused credit lines is less ambiguous than traditional measures such as leverage, which may
indicate financial distress rather than availability of credit. Large assets, a high return to assets, a
high sales/assets ratio, a low debt/assets ratio, a good credit history, and collateral lead to higher
credit availability.
The paper does not look at the macroeconomic determinants of credit constraints.
Economy-wide credit constraints that reflect the doubts about the government's prospects are
reflected in the baseline interest rate charged to firms. The baseline interest rate has a premium
related to the interest rate spread between Argentine government bonds and U.S. government
bonds. This spread, or country risk, was on average above 750 annual basis points in October
2000. An observation from credit constraint theory is that a high probability of default gives
financial institutions an incentive to eliminate credit lines to the borrower. Since November
2000, the international capital market for Argentina has been closed due to international
investors’ belief that Argentina would default on its debt. Since then, the spread has fluctuated
widely, reaching 3,500 basis points in November 2001 and even higher levels since then. This of
course impacts firms, which are mostly cut off from new credit. Hence, it is worthwhile to
explore economy-wide determinants of credit constraints faced by firms in addition to the
individual determinants stressed in this study. Our regressions do not capture this result because
the estimation process is a cross-section for October 2000, but further study on economy-wide
constraints might be possible by comparing the October data with data for January 2001, after
international markets were closed.
This paper can help to study the implications of the law of habeas data, which went into
effect recently in Argentina. This law puts substantial costs on the acquisition of information by
lenders, limiting credit history to 5 years and limiting the access to the database. Our study48
shows in particular that a good median credit situation in the Central de Deudores eases credit
restrictions. A policy that restricts disclosure may end up hurting good firms.49
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Appendices
A. Validation of Financial Statements of Firms
The Central de Deudores del Sistema Financiero of the BCRA’s Superintendencia de Entidades
Financieras has monthly information on every person or firm that has a debt of at least 50 pesos
in the regulated financial system (this is definition of a “debtor”). This database has been in
existence since 1997, when two databases, Principales Deudores de las Entidades Financieras
(Principal Debtors of Financial Institutions) and Resto de Deudores (Other Debtors), were
merged.
The information on firms is divided into two parts, corporations and partnerships/sole
proprietorships. For partnerships/sole proprietorships there are only three bits of information:
start of activity, yearly income, and net worth. For that reason, this paper is restricted to
corporations, for which information, usually annual, from balance sheets and income statements
is available. Balance sheet information covers the following items: assets (current and non-
current), liabilities (current and non-current), and net worth. The information from income
statements is on sales and gross profits. . In a few cases there is information on when a firm
started its activities. The principal economic activity, according to two-digit national income
accounts, and data on employment are sometimes reported.
In addition to the Central de Deudores, two other sources, listed as B and C below,
provided information on the balance sheets and income statements of incorporated firms. Our list
of sources is as follows:
-  Source B (Base de Inspectores): balance sheets and income statements of firms
reviewed by the inspectors of the Superintendencia de Entidades Financieras during inspections
of financial institutions.
-  Source C (Calificadoras de Riesgo): balance sheets and income statements
gathered by risk rating agencies, required to audit “every debtor whose debt is more than $XX,
or at least the greatest fifty debtors” of each financial institution. The amount $XX has varied
and is set currently at $200.000 at each financial institution. This defines the “principal debtors”53
(principales deudores), which are a subset of the large debtors defined below (except for some of
the clients of small financial institutions).
7
-  Source D (Central de Deudores): balance sheets and income statements on “large
debtors” (grandes deudores) provided by financial institutions to the BCRA. “Large debtors” are
defined as firms whose debt in the entire financial system is larger than $200.000.
We pooled the information on large debtors and principal debtors available in sources B,
C, and D. The information from the three data sources could be consolidated thanks to a unique
identification code for each debtor. This identification code is the CUIT or CUIL issued by tax
authorities, or a special ID assigned by the BCRA to the debtor.
As mentioned in Section 3, previous studies had seriously questioned the quality of
Source D information. In this regard, our priors were that source B was the most reliable, since
the financial statements were controlled by inspectors of the BCRA. Source C was expected to
be the next best. On this basis, we describe the validation process we conducted, and its results.
- Validation Procedure
1)  Construct a joint debtor database from sources B, C, and D. Import all registers from
source D, after the elimination of duplicate registers (duplicate: all the fields equal
except for date information was reported). Idem for Sources B and C. The joint file is
called conjunto_base. The starting number of registers is detailed in Table A1.
Table A1.
Source Initial registers Conjunto_base
B (Base) 2,906 2,906
C (Calificadoras) 61,448 38,050
D (Deudores) 372,013 91,535
Source: BCRA
Elimination of Duplicate Registers
2) Eliminate from conjunto_base the registers with date prior to 1/1/1997, sending them
to file viejos.
3) Extract registers from source C with date 00/00/00 and send them to file calif00.
                                                          
7 Source C also has information on how long the relationship of the client with the financial institution has lasted,
and if the client has any ownership ties with the financial institution. This specific information is available for so54
4) Extract unique registers. Send those from sources B and C to file validados, with field
Tipo_Valid that assigns code 8 to source B registers and code 9 to source C registers. The code
allows an identification of the origin of the registers, to screen the information afterwards. The
unique registers from source D are sent to file unicosD.
5) Apply an iterative validation criterion. Look for debtors with the same identification
number (CUIT) and the same date of last balance sheet, comparing seven fields from the balance
sheet (current, non-current, and total assets; current, non-current, and total liabilities; net worth)
and one field from income statements (gross profits). The comparisons are done with a tolerance
of 2, i.e. 2000 pesos, to avoid problems of rounding with decimal places:
i) If B=C=D, assign code Tipo_Valid=1 and send to validados. The redundant
information goes to file basura with Tipo_Valid=1. File basepost1 is created with the registers
that remain after extracting the registers sent to validados and basura. The files validados and
basura contain all the fields that exist in the different sources, not only those used to compare
sources. This same procedure is repeated in the next steps.
ii) If B=C, Tipo_Valid 2.
iii) If B=D, Tipo_Valid 3.
iv) If B different from C or D, Tipo_Valid 4.
v) If C=D, Tipo_Valid 5.
vi) If C different from D, Tipo_Valid 6.
vii) If D1=D2 (two different financial institutions provide same information), Tipo_Valid
7. The file with the remnant registers is called basepost7.
viii) If basepost7=calif00 or basepost7=viejos, except for date of information,
Tipo_Valid 10. The date of information is taken from basepost7.
6) Repeat process in point (5) for remaining debtors, all from source D, comparing only
the three balance sheet items that refer to assets, liabilities and net worth, assigning code
Tipo_Valid 11. The registers that do not pass any of the previous screens are sent to resto.
7) The information from source D that was not validated in any way was added to
validados with the following codes:
i) If from file unicosD, Tipo_Valid 12.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
few firms that it was finally discarded in the econometric exercises.55
ii) If from file resto and not comparable because balance sheet and income statements
were from different dates, include most recent with Tipo_Valid 13.
iii) If from file resto where information from various institutions differed, include the
information from one of the institutions at random as Tipo_Valid 14.
- Evaluation of the Validation Process
Table A2 shows that 17,809 debtors resulted from the validation process. If one restricts the
group to firms with positive assets, there are 17,394 firms left. These firms are the basis for our
“complete sample” in the regressions.
Table A2.
Tipo_valid Total Assets >0            
1 (B=C=D) 870 870
2 (B=C) 445 445
3 (B=D) 264 264
4 (B different C or D) 1070 1,050
5 (C=D) 2335 2,335
6 (C different D) 2918 2,878
7 (D1=D2) 673 673
8 (unique B) 251 248
9 (unique C) 2147 2,071
10 (problematic date) 90 86
11 (problematic fields) 219 219
12 (unique D) 4885 4,642
13 (updated D) 1547 1,539




Though our priors were that source B was the most reliable, and source C was the next
best source, our analysis of the different types of validation led us to conclude otherwise. We
considered as a bad sign a large percentage of firms with zero assets/zero net worth (Table A3),
liabilities/assets>0.9 (Table A4), or ROA=0 (Table A5). We checked if these features had to do
with the fact that some firms were in financial distress, but we ruled that out (that information is
not shown here).56
The most reliable sources turned out to be the cases where two or more independent
sources agreed (i.e., validation criteria 1, 2, 3, 5, and, to a lesser extent, 7). Surprisingly, the data
from validation criterion 13 displayed behavior similar to the previous group. This might be
because when several balance sheets from source D for different dates are available, it means
that a financial institution regularly updates the information. At the same time, these banks might
also be more careful in what they report to the BCRA. Consequently, we considered validation
criteria 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 13 the most reliable. These formed the basis for our preferred sample in
the econometric estimates (validation criterion 11 is a borderline case, but we did not include it
here).
On the other hand, when sources B and C disagree with all else (validation criteria 4 and
6), they usually lead to worse results than if sources B or C are the only available references
(validation criteria 8 and 9). Therefore, we did not consider these to be very reliable validation
criteria. The least reliable criteria turned out to be 10, 12 and 14.
Table A3.
Validation criteria Total Assets=0   Liabilities=0 Net worth=0 All three=0
1 100 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
2 100 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0
3 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 100 1.9 3.7 2.1 1.9
5 100 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0
6 100 1.4 3.6 1.4 1.3
7 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
8 100 1.2 14.3 1.2 1.2
9 100 3.5 11.7 3.7 3.5
10 100 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
11 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
12 100 5.0 5.9 4.9 4.7
13 100 0.5 1.3 0.5 0.5
14 100 22.1 23.2 18.9 18.9
Total (%) 100 2.3 4.4 2.4 2.2
Total cases 17809 415 789 419 398
Source: BCRA.
  - percentages -
Balance sheets with zero's57
Table A4.
Validation 





1 870 36 4 3 0.3
2 445 34 8 11 2.5
3 264 16 6 3 1.1
4 1,050 137 13 68 6.5
5 2,335 118 5 9 0.4
6 2,878 264 9 41 1.4
7 673 16 2 6 0.9
8 248 15 6 0 0.0
9 2,071 132 6 17 0.8
10 86 41 48 1 1.2
11 219 5 2 0 0.0
12 4,642 773 17 69 1.5
13 1,539 111 7 15 1.0
14 74 7 9 0 0.0
Total 17,394 1,705 10 243 1.4
Source: BCRA.
Debt /  Assets
Table A5.
Validation criteria  Assets>0      ROA=0
Percentage  





1 870 18 2.1 221 25.4 631 72.5
2 445 30 6.7 134 30.1 281 63.1
3 264 20 7.6 70 26.5 174 65.9
4 1,050 118 11.2 259 24.7 673 64.1
5 2,335 164 7.0 441 18.9 1,730 74.1
6 2,878 544 18.9 526 18.3 1,808 62.8
7 673 201 29.9 48 7.1 424 63.0
8 248 99 39.9 23 9.3 126 50.8
9 2,071 856 41.3 191 9.2 1,024 49.4
10 86 68 79.1 1 1.2 17 19.8
11 219 55 25.1 8 3.7 156 71.2
12 4,642 2,181 47.0 356 7.7 2,105 45.3
13 1,539 212 13.8 213 13.8 1,114 72.4
14 74 46 62.2 3 4.1 25 33.8
Total 17,394 4,612 26.5 2,494 14.3 10,288 59.1
Source: BCRA.
Return on Assets
- Frequency and Year of Information
We checked the frequency of the information in Table A6. It is often annual, though in some
cases there are a lot of unclassified firms. In the information that was reported on a quarterly58
basis, the income figures were multiplied by four to get the annual equivalents. In the other
cases, no adjustments were made.
Table A6.
Validation criteria Not classified Quarterly Annual Special Others Total
1 0.1 1.7 96.2 1.6 0.3 100
2 0.9 2.0 91.2 5.8 0.0 100
3 0.0 1.1 92.4 4.5 1.9 100
4 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100
5 0.1 0.9 94.0 3.2 1.8 100
6 0.6 2.8 72.2 24.4 0.0 100
7 0.0 0.0 77.4 0.7 21.8 100
8 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100
9 0.6 1.0 48.1 50.3 0.0 100
10 0.0 0.0 74.4 0.0 25.6 100
11 0.0 0.9 86.8 0.5 11.9 100
12 0.0 0.6 65.9 2.3 31.2 100
13 0.0 0.5 93.0 2.1 4.3 100
14 0.0 2.7 64.9 1.4 31.1 100
Total (%) 7.7 1.1 69.4 11.6 10.2 100
Total cases 1,334 193 12,068 2,017 1,782 17,394
Source: BCRA.
 - percentages -
Balance Sheet Frequency
Table A7 shows that most of the information is for years prior to 2000. The advantage of
this is that we could consider the information as predetermined when using it as control in the
regressions in Section 4.59
Table A7.
Validation 
criteria 1997 1998 1999 2000
2001 or 
beyond Total
1 0.1 31.0 66.7 2.2 0.0 100.0
2 0.7 33.0 62.2 4.0 0.0 100.0
3 0.4 48.9 49.2 1.5 0.0 100.0
4 0.2 31.4 62.1 6.3 0.0 100.0
5 11.9 41.5 44.0 2.6 0.0 100.0
6 16.2 36.8 37.9 9.1 0.0 100.0
7 37.9 29.9 30.8 1.5 0.0 100.0
8 1.6 29.0 62.1 7.3 0.0 100.0
9 17.1 29.9 38.0 15.1 0.0 100.0
10 28.7 14.9 16.1 3.4 36.8 100.0
11 18.7 37.4 39.3 4.6 0.0 100.0
12 43.2 25.6 24.5 2.8 3.8 100.0
13 4.5 29.0 56.9 9.5 0.0 100.0
14 59.5 31.1 9.5 0.0 0.0 100.0
Total (%) 20.4 31.9 40.4 6.1 1.2 100.0
Total cases 3,550 5,552 7,022 1,059 211 17,394
Source: BCRA.
 - percentages -
Balance Sheet Dates
B. Validation of Interest Rates
-Raw Interest Rate Data
The raw information is presented in Table B1. The information is from the 103 financial
institutions validated for October 2000.
8 The information refers only to the financial transactions
of the 16,095 firms with both positive assets and positive potential liabilities reported by the
financial system for October 2000.
                                                          
8 There are 113 financial institutions in all, of which 10 were not validated.60
Table B1.
Type of loan Mean Median Std deviation Cases Mean Median Std deviation Cases
Overdrafts 6.3 1.7 13.2 23,720 7.9 2.5 14.4 18,938
Discounted bills - guarantee A1 17.3 2.5 17.2 21 18.2 13.5 17.1 20
Bills and promissory notes 3.8 1.2 6.3 19,517 4.6 1.3 6.6 16,336
House mortgages 2.0 1.0 3.7 103 2.4 1.0 3.9 86
Other mortgages 3.5 1.0 6.1 4,589 5.2 1.3 6.9 3,085
Car loans 1.5 1.4 2.5 660 1.8 1.5 2.6 572
Other pledges 2.8 1.0 5.4 5,279 4.6 1.4 6.3 3,208
Personal 2.1 1.0 4.6 1,198 2.4 1.2 4.8 1,034
Credit card 7.7 1.9 13.0 3,283 11.2 3.2 14.4 2,259
Interfinancial 4.5 0.8 15.8 216 6.5 0.8 18.8 149
To guaranteed public banks 2.6 0.9 4.6 7 2.6 0.9 4.6 7
Other loans 1.4 1.0 4.1 9,712 2.1 1.3 4.9 6,509
Other financial 1.4 0.0 4.2 7,327 4.4 1.0 6.5 2,372
Leases 1.8 0.4 4.1 1,323 3.3 1.3 5.1 712
Miscellaneous 1.1 0.9 1.7 59 1.3 1.0 1.8 48
Small personal 1.1 1.0 0.2 5 1.1 1.0 0.2 5
Source: Central de Deudores, BCRA.
Complete (includes all interest rates)  Complete (excludes interest rates <=.1) 
Interest Rates Reported in October 2000
Interest rates reported as 0.01 can mean either a zero interest rate or a missing value. To
avoid this problem, we decided to exclude all interest rates from the sample that weresmaller
than or equal to 0.1. Even after correcting for this, there was a wide gap between mean and
median values. Moreover, the information on interest rates typically had two modal values, one
at low interest rates and another at high interest rates.
- February Inquiry
Financial institutions are required to report monthly interest rates in percentages. In January
2001, a preliminary analysis was carried out for each of the 89 financial institutions for which
data was available for October 2000. Histograms for the interest rates charged by each
institution, by type of loan, were constructed using the observations of firms classified as “large
debtors” in October 2000.
9 Of these 89 institutions, 35 financial institutions were initially marked
as potentially problematic. This list was the basis for a February 2001 inquiry conducted by the
Superintendencia de Entidades Financieras.   
The institutions were separated into four groups.
- Group 1 containing institutions with no variance in interest rates: 3 institutions, all
excluded.
                                                          
9 The set of firms finally used for October 2000 only overlaps partially with this set. The final set includes firms that
were not “large debtors” in October, and some of these “large debtors” were excluded because no information on
balance sheet items was available from any of the three sources.61
- Group 2 containing institutions with very low interest rates: 10 institutions, of which 7
were O.K. (mainly wholesale banks), 1 misreported units, and 2 were wrong and thus excluded.
- Group 3 containing institutions with very high interest rates: 14 institutions, of which 10
misreported units (they were annual rates), and 4 were wrong and thus excluded.
- Group 4 containing institutions with outliers: 8 institutions, of which we accepted 5 and
excluded 3.
The inquiry conducted in relation to the 89 institutions for which data was available in
January, as well as the analysis of the remaining institutions that were validated later on, led us
to give all 103 institutions three different treatments: eliminate 15 institutions whose rates were
not reliable, transform the interest rates reported by 11 institutions from annual to monthly
values, and accept the rest as monthly rates that were reasonably acceptable.
C. Classification of Credit Situation 
There is a database on bounced checks. This information was retained by each individual bank.
Confidentiality was eliminated at the end of May 2001 when the BCRA made the information
publicly available. Each financial institution must also supply the Central de Deudores with
information on the credit situation of each debtor.
In relation to the credit situation, Table C1 shows how debtors are ranked from 1 to 6
according to actual payments (consumer loans) or estimated repayment potential (commercial
loans).
Table C1.
Situation Commercial loans Consumer loans
1N o r m a l * N o r m a l *
2 Potential risk Occasional arrears
3 Substandard Substandard
4 High risk Unlikely repayment
5 Total loss Total loss
6
*Normal includes all loans with Type A guarantees, which are coded as 11. 
** Total loss (technical provisions) comprises arrears with liquidated financial institutions.
Credit Situation
Total loss (technical provisions)**
The credit situation is decided by each financial institution where a given client has debt.
Though the rating is done by each individual financial institution, under certain conditions62
ratings must be harmonized if the classification differs in more than one category among
institutions (e.g., two institutions that represent more than 20 percent of the debt of that client
have different classifications for more than one category).
Of the 17,394 firms in our database with positive assets, 16,095 firms appear in the
October 2000 data. The actual differences in the credit situations of firms, according to the









55 7 0 . 4
Total 16,095 100.0
*Credit situation 11 was transformed to credit situation 1 (10 cases).
Maximum Differences in Reported Credit Situation*
These differences in the way credit situations were recorded led us to construct a second
measure, a “system” indicator of credit situation, using the median of the values reported by
different institutions.63
D. Definition of Variables
Dependant variables
tascor Interest rate on overdrafts in marginal bank
Explanatory variables
roa Return over assets
lnassets Log of (1+assets)
lnsales/assets Log of (1+sales/assets)
lndebt/assets Log of (1+debt/assets)
sector 0 Equals 1 if  cannot be classified
sector 1 Equals 1 if activity is Agriculture,Fishing or Livestock
sector 3 Equals 1 if activity is Mining
sector 4 Equals 1 if activity is Industry
sector 5 Equals 1 if activity is Electricity,Water or Gas Production
sector 6 Equals 1 if activity is Construction
sector 7 Equals 1 if  activity is Wholesale or Retail Distribution
sector 8 Equals 1 if  activity is other Services
situation 1 Equals 1 if credit situation is 1 in marginal  bank
situation 2 Equals 1 if credit situation is 2 in marginal  bank
situation 3 Equals 1 if credit situation is 3 in marginal  bank
situation 4 Equals 1 if credit situation is 4 in marginal  bank
situation 5 Equals 1 if credit situation is 5 in marginal  bank
situation 6 Equals 1 if credit situation is 6 in marginal  bank
lnbounced/liabilites Log(1+amount in bounced checks/liabilities in marginal bank)
unwarranted/overdrafts Percentage of unwarranted overdrafts over total overdrafts in marginal bank
foreign bank=1 Equals 1 if the marginal bank is foreign
public bank=1 Equals 1 if  the marginal bank is public
wholesale bank=1 Equals 1 if the marginal bank is wholesale
bank's market share Share of the marginal bank's assets in the assets of the financial system
liabilities bank/system
no. bank Number of banks with whom firm operates
no. credit lines Number of types of loans, unused credit lines and unquoted shares in marginal bank
bounced other bank=1 Equals 1 if firm has bounced checks in other banks
system situation (-1,0,1) Equals 1 if median situation in system is larger ( i.e. worse), 0 if equal, -1 if smaller (i.e. better)
no. bank square Square of number of banks
Variables - Price Regressions
Percentage of liabilities in marginal bank  over liabilities in system (excluding write-offs)64
Dependant variables
lndebt/assets Log of (1+debt/assets)
lnliabilities/a. Log of (1+liabilities in main bank/assets)
lnloan/a. Log of (1+loans in main bank/assets)
lnoverdraft/a. Log of (1+overdrafts in main bank/assets)
contitotb
Explanatory variables
roa Return over assets
lnassets Log of (1+assets)
lnsales/assets Log of (1+sales/assets)
lndebt/assets Log of (1+debt/assets)
sector 0 Equals 1 if  cannot be classified
sector 1 Equals 1 if activity is Agriculture,Fishing or Livestock
sector 3 Equals 1 if activity is Mining
sector 4 Equals 1 if activity is Industry
sector 5 Equals 1 if activity is Electricity,Water or Gas Production
sector 6 Equals 1 if activity is Construction
sector 7 Equals 1 if  activity is Wholesale or Retail Distribution
sector 8 Equals 1 if  activity is other Services
situation 1 Equals 1 if credit situation is 1 in main bank
situation 2 Equals 1 if credit situation is 2 in main  bank
situation 3 Equals 1 if credit situation is 3 in main  bank
situation 4 Equals 1 if credit situation is 4 in main  bank
situation 5 Equals 1 if credit situation is 5 in main  bank
situation 6 Equals 1 if credit situation is 6 in main  bank
lnbounced/liabilites Log(1+amount in bounced checks/liabilities in main bank)
guarantees=1 Equals 1 if firm has A or B guarantees
guarrantees/liabilities Percentage of guarantees over liabilities in the main bank
foreign bank=1 Equals 1 if the main bank is foreign
public bank=1 Equals 1 if  the main bank is public
wholesale bank=1 Equals 1 if the main bank is wholesale
bank's market share Share of the main bank's assets in the assets of the financial system
liabilities bank/system
no. banks Number of banks with whom firm operates
no. credit lines Number of types of loans, unused credit lines, and unquoted shares in main bank
bounced other bank=1 Equals 1 if firm has bounced checks in other banks
system situation (-1,0,1)
no. bank square Square of number of banks
Variables - Quantity Regressions
Percentage of liabilities in marginal bank over liabilities in system (excluding write-offs).
Equals 1 if median situation in system is larger ( i.e. worse), 0 if equal, -1 if smaller (i.e. better)
Percentage of unused credit lines over liabilities in main bank (excluding write-offs)65
E. Selection Equations in Heckman Two-Step Procedure
Table E1.
Explanatory variables Complete sample Complete sample
+ Reduced sample
++ Reduced sample 
+++
roa 0.000 0.000 0.109 0.133
(-0.14) (-0.14) (1.78)* (2.47)**
lnassets 0.078 0.105 0.130 0.119
(8.67)*** (10.14)*** (7.52)*** (8.08)***
lnsales/assets 0.130 0.150 0.123 0.142
(4.69)*** (4.35)*** (1.96)** (2.67)***
lndebt/assets 0.071 -0.033 -0.170 -0.129
(1.23) (-0.41) (-1.03) (-0.93)
sector 0 -0.020 0.059 0.088 0.025
(-0.42) (1.03) (0.77) (0.31)
sector 1 -0.405 -0.329 -0.288 -0.278
(-9.45)*** (-6.66)*** (-3.33)*** (-3.78)***
sector 3 0.130 0.193 0.325 0.229
(0.89) (1.22) (1.34) (1.07)
sector 5 -0.103 -0.192 -0.278 -0.279
(-0.76) (-1.35) (-1.47) (-1.54)
sector 6 0.068 0.083 0.162 0.095
(1.22) (1.37) (1.77)* (1.14)
sector 7 -0.190 -0.193 -0.200 -0.216
(-4.78)*** (-4.35)*** (-2.92)*** (-3.60)***
sector 8 -0.171 -0.175 -0.151 -0.179
(-4.34)*** (-4.02)*** (-2.20)** (-2.98)***
situation 2 -0.395 -0.339 -0.569 -0.510
(-6.41)*** (-4.92)*** (-4.62)*** (-4.50)***
situation 3 -0.594 -0.624 -0.839 -0.813
(-7.56)*** (-6.70)*** (-5.15)*** (-5.46)***
situation 4 -1.207 -1.162 -1.236 -1.231
(-16.65)*** (-14.43)*** (-9.77)*** (10.33)***
situation 5 -1.112 -1.062 -1.003 -0.998
(-13.59)*** (-10.25)*** (-6.07)*** (-6.63)***
situation 6 -0.847 -0.811 -0.575 -0.603
(-3.67)*** (-3.00)*** (-1.86)* (-1.96)**
lnbounced/liabilities -0.058 -0.070 -0.085 -0.069
(-5.22)*** (-5.48)*** (-3.49)*** (-3.39)***
foreign bank=1 0.051 0.033 0.014 0.028
(1.63)* (0.95) (0.26) (0.58)
public bank=1 0.391 0.417 0.387 0.391
(9.12)*** (8.57)*** (4.71)*** (5.48)***
wholesale bank=1 0.579 0.580 0.574 0.602
(9.70)*** (9.24)*** (6.48)*** (7.24)***
bank's market share 0.082 0.082 0.080 0.088
(19.96)*** (17.72)*** (10.80)*** (13.65)***
liabilities bank/system 0.234 0.204 0.130 0.130
(3.02)*** (2.38)** (0.96) (1.11)
no. banks -0.035 -0.041 -0.048 -0.049
(-4.09)*** (-5.03)*** (-4.38)*** (-4.81)***
no. credit lines 0.634 0.618 0.562 0.563
(43.10)*** (40.54)*** (23.74)*** (27.44)***
_cons -3.037 -3.147 -3.074 -3.031
- (-23.85)*** (-14.24)*** (-16.55)***
Number of obs 15,822 11,772 4,426 5,860
Censored obs 11,679 8,242 3,078 3,998
Uncensored obs 4,143 3,530 1,348 1,862
r h o 0 . 8 50 . 8 50 . 8 50 . 8 5
s i g m a 0 . 6 90 . 7 00 . 7 00 . 6 9
lambda 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.58
Estimation method Heckman sel. mod. Heckman sel. mod. Heckman sel. mod. Heckman sel. mod.
 
+
 Excludes roa=0 and balance sheets with problems
 
++ 
Validation Criteria 1/2/3/5/7 in Appendix A.
 
+++
 Validation Criteria 1/2/3/5/7/13 in Appendix A.
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis. 1,2 and 3 asterisks indicate significance at 10%, 5% or 1%.







roa 0.133 0.128 0.140 0.142
(2.47)** (2.38)** (2.58)*** (2.61)***
lnassets 0.119 0.112 0.112 0.115
(8.08)*** (7.64)*** (7.63)*** (7.75)***
lnsales/assets 0.142 0.139 0.135 0.136
(2.67)*** (2.61)*** (2.54)** (2.56)***
lndebt/assets -0.129 -0.121 -0.120 -0.112
(-0.93) (-0.87) (-0.86) (-0.81)
sector 0 0.025 0.021 0.015 0.012
(0.31) (0.25) (0.17) (0.14)
sector 1 -0.278 -0.284 -0.288 -0.292
(-3.78)*** (-3.87)*** (-3.91)*** (-3.97)***
sector 3 0.229 0.235 0.244 0.248
(1.07) (1.10) (1.13) (1.15)
sector 5 -0.279 -0.273 -0.276 -0.273
(-1.54) (-1.50) (-1.52) (-1.50)
sector 6 0.095 0.116 0.116 0.119
(1.14) (1.39) (1.39) (1.42)
sector 7 -0.216 -0.211 -0.212 -0.213
(-3.60) (-3.52)*** (-3.53)*** (-3.55)***
sector 8 -0.179 -0.171 -0.174 -0.179
(-2.98)*** (-2.84)*** (-2.89)*** (-2.97)***
situation 2 -0.510 -0.476 -0.611 -0.612
(-4.50)*** (-4.17)*** (-4.92)*** (-4.92)***
situation 3 -0.813 -0.753 -0.838 -0.833
(-5.46)*** (-4.99)*** (-5.36)*** (-5.34)***
situation 4 -1.231 -1.132 -1.163 -1.155
(10.33)*** (-9.38)*** (-9.53)*** (-9.45)***
situation 5 -0.998 -0.953 -1.038 -1.039
(-6.63)*** (-6.35)*** (-6.76)*** (-6.78)***
situation 6 -0.603 -0.539 -0.742 -0.738
(-1.96)** (-1.75)* (-2.35)** (-2.33)**
lnbounced/liabilities -0.069 -0.049 -0.043 -0.044
(-3.39)*** (-2.33)** (-2.07)** (-2.10)**
foreign bank=1 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.032
(0.58) (0.52) (0.54) (0.66)
public bank=1 0.391 0.389 0.394 0.400
(5.48)*** (5.45)*** (5.50)** (5.58)***
wholesale bank=1 0.602 0.610 0.607 0.611
(7.24)*** (7.33)*** (7.30)*** (7.34)***
bank's market share 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088
(13.65)*** (13.63)*** (13.57)*** (13.53)***
liabilities bank/system 0.130 0.109 0.114 0.015
(1.11) (0.93) (0.97) (0.12)
no. banks -0.049 -0.046 -0.046 -0.081
(-4.81)*** (-4.53)*** (-4.51)*** (-3.54)***
no. credit lines 0.563 0.564 0.564 0.568
(27.44)*** (27.42)*** (27.38)*** (27.40)***
_cons -3.031 -2.961 -2.957 -2.833
(-16.55)*** (-16.11)*** (-16.06)*** (14.30)***
bounced other bank=1 - -0.284 -0.286 -0.279
- (-4.00)*** (-4.01)*** (-3.90)***
system situation (-1,0,1) - - -0.255 -0.259
-- (-3.02)*** (-3.07)***
no banks square --- 0 . 0 0 2
--- (1.72)*
Number of observations 5,860 5,860 5,860 5,860
Censored obs 3,998 3,998 3,998 3,998
Uncensored obs 1,862 1,862 1,862 1,862
rho 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
sigma 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.67
lambda 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57
Estimation method Heckman sel. mod. Heckman sel. mod. Heckman sel. mod. Heckman sel. mod.
 
+++
Validation Criteria 1/2/3/5/7/13 in Appendix A.
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis. 1,2 and 3 asterisks indicate significance at 10%, 5% or 1%.
Unused Credit Ratio Selection Equations: Additional Variables